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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
I. 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This appeal originated from a magistrate court involving a "moped", and what constitutes 
a "motor vehicle" in relation to the application of Idaho's DUI laws. The intermediate appeal 
before the Honorable Gerald F. Schroeder, presiding, affirmed the magistrate, applying the 
analysis within State v. Trusdall, 155 Idaho 965, 318 P.3d 955 (Idaho App. 2014) wherein they 
defined a "motor vehicle" to be what is "self-propelled", while addressing the operation of a 
UTV, not excluded or exempt from within the statute as is the case of a "moped", wherein 
certain exemptions are declared from "motor vehicle", as the statutes, pursuant to the 2008 
legislative amendments, had modified the definition of a moped and excluded them from the 
definition of motor vehicle. The Trusdall case, supra, did not concern the issue presented in this 
appeal. 
The Appellant, a Boise resident, was charged with a DUI offense, alleging he operated a 
"motor vehicle", upon a public street in Boise, Idaho, while under the influence of alcohol, in 
violation of LC. § 18-8004, alleged as an "excessive". Appellant was operating his "moped" [ a 
stipulated fact with the State], and was then riding his moped in the designated bike lane on 
Boise Avenue during the early morning hours of August 23, 2015. 
The statutory definition of a "moped" was amended during the 2008 Legislative sessions 
regarding "slow moving, limited speed, motor driven cycles", expressly excluding them from 
what is a "motor vehicle". 
The lower district court relied upon Trusdall, supra, and a limited analysis of "self-
propelled", failing to address the analysis of the exclusionary provisions created by the 2008 
Legislative amendments that apply to mopeds. 
Trusdall, supra, dealt solely with a "UTV", a "mode of movement" not listed among the 
statutory exceptions of a motor vehicle; the Legislature has the exclusive right to makes the 
laws, as the legislative branch, and may declare what is not a "motor vehicle", and as we focus 
upon "statutory definitions", the Legislature specifically defined a "UTV" to be a "motor 
vehicle", notwithstanding the circuitous analysis in Trusdall, as the definition begins with LC. 
§49-122U(8), stating: "Utility type vehicle or UTV means a utility type vehicle or UTV as 
defined in section 67-7101, Idaho Code", wherein LC.§ 67-7101 defines a UTV: 
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(17) "Utility type vehicle" or "UTV" means any recreational motor 
vehicle other than an A TV, motorbike or snowmobile as defined in this section, 
designed for and capable of travel over designated roads, traveling on four ( 4) or 
more tires, maximum width less than seventy-four (74) inches, maximum weight 
less than two thousand (2,000) pounds, and having a wheelbase of one hundred 
ten (110) inches or less. A utility type vehicle must have a minimum width of fifty 
(50) inches, a minimum weight of at least nine hundred (900) pounds or a 
wheelbase of over sixty-one (61) inches. Utility type vehicle does not include golf 
carts, vehicles specially designed to carry a disabled person, implements of 
husbandry as defined in section 49-110(2), Idaho Code, or vehicles otherwise 
registered under title 49, Idaho Code. A "utility type vehicle" or "UTV" also 
means a recreational off-highway vehicle or ROV. 
It remains of interest why the Court of Appeals found the need to engage in a "defining 
moment" to conclude a "UTV" is a "motor vehicle" because it is "self-propelled", when the 
existing statutory language defines it to be a "motor vehicle", and not excluded. 
The Trusdall court engaged a contextual discussion of the general definition of "motor 
vehicle", acknowledging the 2008 legislative amendments, but failed to recite the legislative 
definition of "UTV", which effectively provided their answer for defining a "UTV" as a 
"recreational motor vehicle", nowhere excluded from the definition of"motor vehicle". 
The legislature declared a "UTV" to be a motor vehicle, and dedicated much effort to 
describe specific design criteria, including tire contact with the road, the range of their width, 
weight, and wheelbase, and that definition did not meet any exempt or excluded criteria from the 
recreational motor vehicle definition, such as a golf cart, or a vehicle designed to carry a 
disabled person, implements of husbandry as defined in I.C. §49-110(2), or vehicles otherwise 
registered under title 49, Idaho Code. The Trusdall UTV was a "motor vehicle" under I.C. § 67-
7101, and appeared unnecessary to analysis I.C. §49-123(V)(2)(h) to get the needed result. 
Trusdall was not asked to address a "moped" in any manner, but Trusdall, did recognize 
there were declared exceptions to "motor vehicle", stating: 
"However, the legislature has since amended I.C. §49-123(2)(g), adding 
the following emphasized language to the statute: Motor vehicle. Every vehicle 
which is self-propelled, and for the purpose of titling and registration meets 
federal motor vehicle safety standards as defined in section 49-107, Idaho Code. 
Motor vehicle does not include vehicles moved solely by human power, electric 
personal assistive mobility devices and motorized wheelchairs or other such 
vehicles that are specifically exempt from titling or registration requirements 
under title 49, Idaho Code. [3] (Emphasis ours). 
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The statutory citation to which Trusdall was referring is LC §49-123(V)(2)(h), not LC. 
§49-123(2)(g), as that provision (LC. §49-123(V)(2)(g)), now refers to a glider kit. Within the 
statutory language that defines "moped", they are declared exempt from being titled (and 
apparently not to be registered either), as addressed hereafter. 
What motivated the Court of Appeals to avoid the definition of "UTV", that in 2014 was 
cited as LC. §49-122U(8), and LC. § 67-7101(17), having before been defined that way ever 
since at least 2005, (as LC. § 67-7101)(15)), and instead chose to engage statutory construction 
of various components of the "motor vehicle" definition, and explaining the need to avoid 
"superfluous language", provides no rational authority to apply that analysis to the statutory 
definition of "moped", as a moped is not the same "means of movement" as that of a "UTV, and 
more to the point, a moped is excluded from "motor vehicle" because mopeds are not to be titled. 
Because of the "statutory definition" of a UTV, and the limited analysis within Trusdall 
to be only that which was before it, why our lower district court would cite the analysis presented 
in Trusdall, confronted only with a "UTV", when "moped" was never the subject, and the 
"exclusion" of a moped from the definition of motor vehicle was not before the Court of 
Appeals, presents the justification for the continuation of this appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court. 
The "nature of this case" may be considered one of statutory interpretation, presenting a 
question of law to confirm that a "moped" is excluded from the definition of "motor vehicle" 
under Idaho law, and because of that, the lower appellate court erred when it determined 
Appellant was operating a motor vehicle, and was therefore committing a criminal act when he 
operated his Moped on Boise Avenue in the Bike lane, while having consumed alcohol, 
essentially no different than a bicyclist riding a bike along Boise Avenue, while having consumed 
alcohol. 
II. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW AND APPLICABLE 
LAW ON STATUTORY INTERPRETATIONS 
The standard of review upon an appeal originating in the magistrate court is stated in 
various authorities, starting with State v. DeWitt, 145 Idaho 709, 184 P.3d 215 (App 2008), 
wherein it held: 
"The Supreme Court has recently altered the standard by which we review 
a decision of the district court acting in its appellate capacity. Rather than directly 
reviewing the magistrate court's decision independently of, but with due regard 
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for, the district court's decision, we instead directly review the district court's 
decision. Losser v. Bradstreet, 145 Idaho 670, 183 P.3d 758 (2008). We do 
examine the magistrate record to determine whether there is substantial and 
competent evidence to support the magistrate's findings of fact and whether the 
magistrate's conclusions of law follow from those findings. If those findings are 
so supported and the conclusions follow therefrom and if the district court 
affirmed the magistrate's decision, we affirm the district court's decision as a 
matter of procedure. Id.; Nicholls v. Blaser, 102 Idaho 559, 633 P.2d 1137 
(1981)." (Emphasis ours) 
Thereafter it was again stated within State v. Trusdall, 155 Idaho 965, 318 P.3d 
955 (2014): 
"The Supreme Court reviews the trial court (magistrate) record to 
determine whether there is substantial and competent evidence to support the 
magistrate's findings of fact and whether the magistrate's conclusions of law 
follow from those findings. If those findings are so supported and the conclusions 
follow therefrom and if the district court affirmed the magistrate's decision, we 
affirm the district court's decision as a matter of procedure. Pelayo v. Pelayo, 154 
Idaho 855, 858-59, 303 P.3d 214, 217-18 (2013) (quoting Bailey v. Bailey, 153 
Idaho 526, 529, 284 P.3d 970, 973 (2012)). Thus, the appellate courts do not 
review the decision of the magistrate court. Bailey, 153 Idaho at 529, 284 P.3d at 
973. Rather, we are procedurally bound to affirm or reverse the decisions of the 
district court. State v. Korn, 148 Idaho 413, 415 n. 1, 224 P.3d 480, 482 n. 1 
(2009)." 
Again stated in Veenstra v. Veenstra & H&W, 40683 (Court of Appeals, 2/7/2014): 
"On review of a decision of the district court, rendered in its appellate 
capacity, we examine the record from the magistrate court to determine whether 
there is substantial and competent evidence to support the magistrate's findings of 
fact and whether the magistrate's conclusions of law follow from those findings. 
Losser v. Bradstreet, 145 Idaho 670, 672, 183 P.3d 758, 760 (2008); State v. 
DeWitt, 145 Idaho 709, 711, 184 P.3d 215, 217 (Ct. App. 2008). If those findings 
are so supported and the conclusions follow therefrom and if the district court 
affirmed the magistrate's decision, we affirm the district court's decision as a 
matter of procedure. Losser, 145 Idaho at 672, 183 P.3d at 760. Thus, this Court 
does not directly review the decision of the magistrate court. Bailey v. Bailey, 153 
Idaho 526, 529, 284 P.3d 970, 973 (2012). Rather, we are procedurally bound to 
affirm or reverse the decisions of the district court. Id. Over questions of law, 
including statutory interpretation, we exercise free review. Fields v. State, 149 
Idaho 399, 400, 234 P.3d 723, 724 (2010); Rhoades v. State, 148 Idaho 247, 250, 
220 P.3d 1066, 1069 (2009); Downing v. State, 136 Idaho 367, 370, 33 P.3d 841, 
844 (Ct. App. 2001)." 
Again stated in Peterson v. Peterson, 156 Idaho 85,320 P. 3d, 1244 (2014): 
9 
"In an appeal from a judgment of the district court acting in its appellate 
capacity over a case appealed to it from the magistrate court, we review the 
judgment of the district court. We exercise free review over the issues of law 
decided by the district court to determine whether it correctly stated and applied 
the applicable law." State Dep't of Health and Welfare v. Slane, 155 Idaho 274, 
277,311 P.3d 286,289 (2013) (citations omitted)." 
Recently stated in Workman v. Rich, 44701, (Court of Appeals, August 31, 2017): 
"For an appeal from the district court, sitting in its appellate capacity over 
a case from the magistrate division, this Court's standard of review is the same as 
expressed by the Idaho Supreme Court. The Supreme Court reviews the 
magistrate record to determine whether there is substantial and competent 
evidence to support the magistrate's findings of fact and whether the magistrate's 
conclusions of law follow from those findings. State v. Korn, 148 Idaho 413,415, 
224 P .3d 480, 482 (2009). If those findings are so supported and the conclusions 
follow therefrom, and if the district comi affirmed the magistrate's decision, we 
affirm the district court's decision as a matter of procedure. Id. Thus, the appellate 
courts do not review the decision of the magistrate. State v. Trusdall, 155 Idaho 
965, 968, 318 P.3d 955, 958 (Ct. App. 2014). Rather, we are procedurally bound 
to affirm or reverse the decision of the district court. Id." 
The standard of review for statutory interpretation remains one of free review, and the 
court's objective is to give effect to the legislative intent with respect to the interpretation of the 
Legislature's enactments. Among the more recent analysis is that expressed in Hoffer v. 
Shappard, 160 Idaho 870, 380 P.3d 681 (2016), wherein our Supreme Court reiterated the court's 
objective regarding statutory interpretation. It states: 
"The objective of statutory interpretation is to give effect to legislative 
intent." State v. Yzaguirre, 144 Idaho 471, 475, 163 P.3d 1183, 1187 (2007). 
"when interpreting a statute, the Court begins with the literal words of the 
statute .... " Williams v. Blue Cross of Idaho, 151 Idaho 515, 521, 260 P.3d 1186, 
1192 (2011 ). "If the statutory language is unambiguous, the clearly expressed 
intent of the legislative body must be given effect .... " Idaho Youth Ranch, Inc. v. 
Ada Cnty. Bd. of Equalization, 157 Idaho 180, 184-85, 335 P.3d 25, 29-30 (2014) 
(internal quotations omitted) ( quoting St. Lukes Reg' l Med. Ctr., Ltd. v. Bd. of 
Comm 'rs of Ada Cnty., 146 Idaho 753, 755, 203 P.3d 683, 685 (2009)). This 
Court does not have the authority to modifv an unambiguous legislative 
enactment. Verska v. Saint Alphonsus Reg' l Med. Ctr., 151 Idaho 889, 895, 265 
P.3d 502, 508 (2011) (quoting Berry v. Koehler, 84 Idaho 170, 177,369 P.2d 1010, 
1013 (1962))." (Emphasis ours). 
In State v. Lee, 37213 (Idaho Ct. of Appeals, 6-29-2011) Docket No. 37213, filed June 29, 
2011, the Court of Appeals provided reference to the standard of review and objective of 
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statutory interpretation to always be to give effect to the plain language used in a statute, stating: 
"This Court exercises free review over the application and construction of 
statutes. State v. Reyes, 139 Idaho 502, 505, 80 P.3d 1103, 1106 (Ct. App. 2003) . 
. Where the language ofa statute is plain and unambiguous, this Court must give 
effect to the statute as written, without engaging in statutory construction. State 
v. Rhode, 133 Idaho 459, 462, 988 P.2d 685, 688 (1999); State v. Burnight, 132 
Idaho 654, 659, 978 P.2d 214, 219 (1999); State v. Escobar, 134 Idaho 387, 389, 
3 P.3d 65, 67 (Ct. App. 2000). The language of the statute is to be given its plain, 
obvious, and rational meaning. Burnight, 132 Idaho at 659, 978 P.2d at 219. If the 
language is clear and unambiguous, there is no occasion for the court to resort to 
legislative history or rules of statutory interpretation. Escobar, 134 Idaho at 389, 3 
P.3d at 67. When this Court must engage in statutory construction, it has the duty 
to ascertain the legislative intent and give effect to that intent. Rhode, 133 Idaho 
at 462, 988 P.2d at 688. To ascertain the intent of the legislature, not only must 
the literal words of the statute be examined, but also the context of those words, 
the public policy behind the statute and its legislative history. Id. It is incumbent 
upon a court to give a statute an interpretation which will not render it a nullity. 
State v. Beard, 135 Idaho 641, 646, 22 P.3d 116, 121 (Ct. App. 2001). 
Constructions of a statute that would lead to an absurd result are disfavored. State 
v. Doe, 140 Idaho 271, 275, 92 P.3d 521, 525 (2004); State v. Yager, 139 Idaho 
680, 690, 85 P.3d 656, 666 (2004). The Court will not deal in subtle refinements 
of the legislation, but will ascertain and give effect to the purpose and intent of 
the legislature, based on the whole act and every word therein, lending 
substance and meaning to the provisions. State v. Payne, 146 Idaho 548, 575, 
199 P.3d 123, 150 (2008)." (Emphasis ours). 
In Ada County v. Gibson, 126 Idaho 854, 893 P. 2d 801 (1995), the appellate court stated: 
"Interpretation of an ordinance, like construction of a statute, is an issue of 
law. Therefore, this Court exercises free review of the district court's decision. See 
State v. Nelson, 119 Idaho 444, 446, 807 P.2d 1282, 1284 (Ct.App.1991). It is 
axiomatic that the obiective in interpreting a statute or ordinance is to derive the 
intent of the legislative body that adopted the act. Ada County Assessor v. Roman 
Catholic Diocese of Boise, 123 Idaho 425, 428, 849 P.2d 98, 101 (1993); Cox v. 
Department of Insurance, 121 Idaho 143,146,823 P.2d 177, 180 (Ct.App.1991). 
Any such analysis begins with the literal language of the enactment. Matter of 
Permit No. 36-7200, 121 Idaho 819, 823, 828 P.2d 848, 852 (1992); Local 1494 of 
Intern. Ass'n of Firefighters v. City of Coeur d'Alene, 99 Idaho 630,639, 586 P.2d 
1346, 1355 (1978); Messenger v. Burns, 86 Idaho 26, 29-30, 382 P.2d 913, 915 
(1963). Where the statutory language is unambiguous, the clearly expressed 
intent of the legislative body must be given effect, and there is no occasion for a 
court to consider rules of statutory construction. Ada County v. Roman Catholic 
Diocese, 123 Idaho at 428, 849 P.2d at 101; Matter of Permit No. 36-7200, 121 
Idaho at 823, 828 P.2d at 852; Sherwood v. Carter, 119 Idaho 246, 254, 805 P.2d 
452, 460 (1991). Where the language of a statute or ordinance is ambiguous, 
however, the court looks to rules of construction for guidance, Lawless v. Davis, 
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98 Idaho 175, 560 P.2d 497 (1977), and may consider the reasonableness of 
proposed interpretations. Umphrey v. Sprinkel, 106 Idaho 700, 706, 682 P.2d 
1247, 1253 (1983). Constructions that would lead to absurd or unreasonably harsh 
results are disfavored. Gavica v. Hanson, 101 idaho 58, 60, 608 P.2d 861, 863 
(1980); Lawless, 98 Idaho at 177, 560 P.2d at 499." (Emphasis ours). 
In Wheeler v. Idaho Dept. of Health and Welfare, 147 Idaho 257,207 P.3d 988 (2009), the 
appellate courts again stated: 
"When interpreting a statute, this Court must strive to give force and effect to 
the legislature's intent in passing the statute. Davaz v. Priest River Glass Co., 
Inc., 125 Idaho 333, 336, 870 P.2d 1292, 1295 (1994). "It must begin with the 
literal words of the statute; those words must be given their plain, usual, and 
ordinary meaning; and the statute must be construed as a whole. " ~McLean v. 
Maverik Country Stores, Inc., 142 Idaho 810, 813, 135 P.3d 756, 759 (2006) 
( citations omitted). "Where the language of a statute is plain and unambiguous, 
this Court must give effect to the statute as written, without engaging in 
statutory construction." State v. Rhode, 133 Idaho 459, 462, 988 P.2d 685, 688 
(1999). However, if the result is "palpably absurd," this Court must engage in 
statutory construction. Id. When engaging in statutory construction, this Court 
has a "duty to ascertain the legislative intent, and give effect to that intent. " Id. 
" (T[he Court must construe a statute as a whole, and consider all sections of 
applicable statutes together to determine the intent of the legislature." Davaz, 
125 Idaho at 336, 870 P.2d at 1295 (internal citation omitted). "[The Court] also 
must take account of all other matters such as the reasonableness of the proposed 
interpretations and the policy behind the statute." Id." (Emphasis ours). 
The interpretation and application of a statute presents a question of law over which a 
court will exercise free review. Grazer v. Jones, 154 Idaho 58, 63-64, 294 P.3d 184, 189-190 
(2013). 
III. 
SPECIAL REGARD TO CRIMINAL STATUTES 
When a criminal statute is found to be constitutionally vague, such as with respect to the 
interpretation of the statutory language that becomes a specific element of the criminal act, the 
statute may be constitutionally flawed (see State v. Lopez, 98 Idaho 581, 570 P.2d 259 (1976), 
wherein a statute was held unconstitutionally vague, failing to further define the terms used in 
the statute, and failing to apprise a defendant what conduct violated the statute. The Lopez court 
focused upon the complaint, and whether it charged a criminal offense and alleged conduct with 
sufficient particularity that an accused would be informed what conduct constituted a criminal 
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offense. That court held the complaint defective because it did not describe an offense, and due 
process requires description of an offense, and the accused must be adequately apprised 
regarding the elements of the criminal offense. 
In State v. Trusdall, 155 Idaho 965,318 P.3d 955 (2014), the Court stated: 
Additionally, if a criminal statute is ambiguous, the rule of lenity applies 
and the statute must be construed in favor of the accused. State v. Morrison, 14 3 
Idaho 459, 461, 147 P.3d 91, 93 (Ct.App.2006). However, where a review of the 
legislative history and underlying public policy makes the meaning of the statute 
clear, the rule of lenity will not apply. State v. Bradshaw, 155 Idaho 43 7, 440, 313 
P.3d 765, 768 (Ct.App.2013). If the ambiguity remains after examining the text, 
context, history, and policy of the statute, the interpretive tie between the two or 
more reasonable readings is resolved in favor of the defendant. Id. at 440-41, 313 
P.3d at 768-69. 
Since the Idaho Legislature excluded a moped from the titling requirement, thus 
excluding a moped from the definition of "motor vehicle" in 2008, the element of a "motor 
vehicle" in this criminal case is missing from the factual allegations filed against Appellant, as 
the State has stipulated Appellant was riding a moped, and by Idaho law, a moped is not a "motor 
vehicle". 
A fundamental element in Idaho's DUI statute is the element the accused must be 
involved with the operation (to drive or be in actual physical control), of a "motor vehicle", 
while under the influence of alcohol. As this appellate court is infinitely familiar, the Idaho Jury 
Instruction states: 
Idaho Jury Instructions Criminal Instructions 
SECTION 1000. DRIVING WHILE UNDER THE INFLUENCE OR 
WITHOUT PRIVILEGES 
ICJI 1000. DRIVING WHILE UNDER THE INFLUENCE 
INSTRUCTION NO 
-----
In order for the defendant to be guilty of driving under the Influence the state 
must prove each of the following: 
1. On or about [date] 
2. in the state of Idaho 
3. the defendant [name], [drove] [or] [ was in actual physical control of] 
4. a [ commercial] motor vehicle 
5. upon a highway, street or bridge or upon public or private property open to the 
public, 
6. [while under the influence of (a combination of) (alcohol) (or) (drugs) (or) (an 
intoxicating substance).] (Emphasis added) 
There is no definition of "motor vehicle" in Title 18, Idaho Code, and the only definition 
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is found within Title 49, Idaho Code. As the Court in State v. Knott, 132 Idaho 476, 974 P.2d 1 
105 (1999) then specifically observed: 
"There is a close interaction between the Title 49 statutes and similar 
statutory provisions in Title 18, particularly the DUI provision found in section 
18-8004. The statutes relate to the same subject matter and on occasions have 
been addressed by the legislature at the same time." 132 Idaho at 479, 974 P.2d at 
1008. 
After further observing that it was in 1984 that the DUI statute was transferred from Title 
49 to Title 18, the Court then concluded that when identical terms are used in both sections they 
should be construed by reference to the common definitions provided in the Code. It stated: 
"Idaho Code§ 73-113 [now I.C. § 73-113(3)] indicates that words and 
phrases used in the Idaho Code are to be "construed according to the context and 
approved usage of the language." Given that identical terms are used in the 
statutes, and the legislature amended the relevant phrase to statutes in both Title 
49 and Title 18 in the same bill after the DUI statute was transferred to the 
criminal code, the "context and approved usage" of the relevant phrase indicates 
that its meaning is the same in both titles." 132 Idaho at 479, 974 P.2d at 1008 
(bracketed reference to change in statutory citation added). 
Therefore, a court is required to go to Title 49, and if "different opinions" exist as to what 
a "motor vehicle" is defined to be, that raises the constitutionality of the DUI laws, when the 
essential element of the crime ( a "motor vehicle") is being materially disregarded, as every 
individual accused of criminal activity must be adequately apprised what conduct constitutes the 
criminal act before being charged, and that requires a concise definition as to what a "motor 
vehicle" is, as it is promulgated by the legislature, and correctly enforced by the courts. 
This Appellant relied entirely upon a judicial determination that had been rendered by an 
Ada County Magistrate that declared Idaho's 2008 Legislative amendments specifically defined 
"moped" to be excluded and exempted from the definition of "motor vehicle". For prosecutorial 
agencies to dispute legislative intent and embrace conflicting judicial interpretations of the 
Statutory definition, creates inevitable concerns Idaho's DUI Statute may be unconstitutionally 
flawed, if inconsistent definitions as to various "modes of movement" are allowed to exist, when 
some are specifically declared not to be motor vehicles. To allow this inconsistency renders a 
fundamental element of the crime of DUI to be vague and ambiguous, if different courts in the 
same judicial district define "motor vehicle" differently. That consequence serves to benefit this 
Appellant, due to the Rule of Lenity in criminal cases, as it is also stated in State v. Alley, 155 
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Idaho 972,318 P.3d 962 (Ct App 2014), that: 
"Additionally, if a criminal statute is ambiguous, the rule of lenity applies 
and the statute must be construed in favor of the accused. State v. Dewey, 131 
Idaho 846, 848, 965 P.2d 206, 208 (Ct.App.1998); State v. Martinez, 126 Idaho 
801, 803, 891 P.2d 1061, 1063 (Ct.App.1995). However, where a review of the 
legislative history makes the meaning of the statute clear, the rule of lenity will 
not be applied. State v. Bradshaw, 155 Idaho 437, 440, 313 P.3d 765, 768 
(Ct.App.2013); State v. Jones, 151 Idaho 943, 947, 265 P.3d 1155, 1159 
(Ct.App.2011). The rule of lenity applies only when grievous ambiguity or 
uncertainty in a criminal statute that is not resolved by looking at the text, 
context, legislative history, or underlying policy of the statute allows for 
multiple reasonable constructions. Bradshaw, 155 Idaho at 441, 313 P.3d at 
769." (Emphasis ours). 
As also recently stated in State v. Olsen, 161 Idaho 385, 386 P.3d 908 (2016), the 
Supreme Court held that: 
"Statutory interpretation is a question of law over which this Court exercises free 
review. 'The rule of lenity states that criminal statutes must be strictly 
construed in favor of defendants."' State v. Anderson, 145 Idaho 99, 103, 175 
P.3d 788, 792 (2008)." (Emphasis ours). 
It would therefore appear that the "Rule of Lenity" is an element of statutory 
construction, and not to be viewed as an issue that is being raised within the appeal. 
IV. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS AND COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS BELOW 
Appellant was stopped by a Boise City Police Officer because of a tail light failure. 
Appellant was operating what the Officer then described to be a "small motorcycle" in the 
bicycle lane, along Boise Avenue, on August 23, 2015, at 2:37 a.m .. The officer charged 
Appellant with two citations, No. 1454043, alleging the act of driving a motor vehicle while 
under the influence of alcohol (second offense), and a second Citation, containing two violations, 
No. 1454044, alleging Appellant was operating a motor vehicle with fictitious display, and 
Failure to carry or show proof ofliability insurance while operating a motor vehicle. 
An initial plea of not guilty was entered; discovery exchanged, a motion to dismiss filed, 
though deemed untimely by the lower court, despite being perceived by Defense counsel as a 
jurisdictional issue under Rule 12(b)(2), I.C.R., capable of being raised any time during the 
proceedings, and following that denial, briefing ensued in the course of addressing what 
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instructions would be given to the jury. 
Defense counsel believed dismissal was the only appropriate disposition, as Appellant 
was operating his "moped", not a "motor vehicle", defined by Idaho law, and from that 
definition, no criminal act had taken place, believing the lower court had no statutory authority to 
require Appellant to stand trial on a factually and legally flawed charge. 
After the lower court held the motion untimely, declaring it not a jurisdictional issue, 
the controversy centered upon jury instructions, creating a debate with the magistrate court, 
serving to posture the case for eventual appeal over jury instructions, as the magistrate was 
unwilling to dismiss the matter, or properly instruct the jury as to the current law in Idaho, as 
expressly declared by the 2008 Legislature. 
On the morning of the scheduled jury trial, the court and counsel met in chambers to 
discuss the controversy, and concurred the dispute centered on the act of operating a "moped" 
on the streets of Boise, and whether that constituted the operation of a "motor vehicle", for 
purposes of the application of Idaho's DUI laws. Through that discussion, the parties 
acquiesced in structuring the issue for appellate review in a manner that would avoid a trial 
and the dispute over the instructions to be given to the jury, and to instead have the appellate 
court determine the Legislative Intent when the Idaho Legislature declared a "moped" is 
excluded and exempted from the definition of "motor vehicle", under the 2008 Legislative 
amendments, the effect of which defined a "moped" to be a "slow moving, limited speed, 
motor driven cycle, not to be titled, and by virtue of the Senate Committee minutes of the 
2008 Legislature, not to be registered, and expressly excluded from what constitutes a "motor 
vehicle" by the exclusionary language, using the plain and ordinary meaning of the words in 
defining a "Motor Vehicle", identifying several exclusions from the definition of what 
constitutes a "motor vehicle" in their statutory interpretation, specifically confirmed in 
various locations within the 2008 legislative amendments. 
These statutory amendments were not included as part of the record in the appeal to 
the district court, and so a motion for the district court to take judicial notice of those statutory 
amendments was filed and that motion was granted, as any matter on which the court of original 
jurisdiction could have taken judicial notice will be considered b the appellate court. City of 
Lewiston v. Frary, 91 Idaho 322,325- 27, 420 P.2d 805, 808-10 (1966); LC. § 9-101; Rule 201, 
I.R.E.; See also, Crawford v. Department of Correction, 133 Idaho'633, 636 n. 1, 991 P.2d 358, 
16 
361 n. 1 (1999) ("We take judicial notice of House Bill 73, which was not submitted as part of the 
record on appeal, but is contained in the public records maintained by the Office of Legislative 
Services located in the State Capitol Building. I.R.E. 201(f); Trautman v. Hill, 116 Idaho 
337,340,775 P.2d 651,654 (Ct.App. 1989); State v. Howell, 122 Idaho 209, [213], 832 P.2d 1144, 
[I 148] (Ct.App. 1992)." (bracketed references added)). For the convenience of this Appellate 
court, Appellant has attached to an Appendix to this Opening Brief those specific amendments, 
and to the extent preferred, to then file a motion with the Idaho Supreme Court to similarly take 
Judicial Notice of those 2008 Legislative amendments to the motor vehicle statutes. 
The Parties elected to advance this case upon appellate review through a conditional plea, 
and formulated their stipulation of facts, eliminating need for a jury trial, and pursuant to those 
discussions, the magistrate court, the Boise City Attorney, the Appellant and his defense counsel 
formulated the factual presentation entitled STIPULATION TO FACTS, filed June 28, 2016, 
entered the conditional plea of guilty the morning of June 28, 2016, with disposition entered 
September 30, 2016, from which the Appeal was taken to the District Court, filed October 4, 
2016, and entry of the Stay of Execution filed October 14, 2016. 
The district court, Honorable Gerald F. Schroeder presiding, affirmed the magistrate, 
concluding that the analysis contained within State v. Trusdall, 155 Idaho 965, 318 P.3d 955 
(2014), applied to a moped and would control the disposition in this case. The district court, 
relying upon Trusdall, concluded that: 
"The defendant's moped is a motor vehicle for purpose of his DUI 
conviction. It is a self-propelled vehicle, as has been stipulated. It is not a vehicle 
that is moved solely by human power, like a bicycle. It is not a vehicle such as a 
motorized wheelchair or "other electric assistive device used by disabled 
individuals, which are specifically excluded from the definition of a motor 
vehicle." 
What the district court failed to undertake is the application of the entire expressed 
language contained in the statutory definition of "motor vehicle", as identified in LC §49-
123(V)(2)(h), which states: 
"(h) Motor vehicle. Every vehicle which is self-propelled, and for the 
purpose of titling and registration meets federal motor vehicle safety standards as 
defined in section 49-107, Idaho Code. Motor vehicle does not include vehicles 
moved solely by human power, electric personal assistive mobility devices and 
motorized wheelchairs or other such vehicles that are specifically exempt from 





The district court recited the facts stipulated to by the State and Appellant in the 
intermediate appeal. Appellant provided the magistrate and Respondent photographic depiction of 
the physical features of the moped, available to the intermediate court for appellate review. This 
moped was personally constructed by Appellant from various salvaged small cycle parts discarded 
by cycle shops. The photographs illustrate the construction, mechanical composition, method of 
movement, pedals to start, operate, sprocket design for limited speed, small engine displacement 
(under 50cc), achieving the literal criteria defining a "moped" under Idaho law. 
From those stipulated facts, listing those that are essential to this appeal, are the following: 
1. On August 23 rd, 2015, at 2:37 in the morning, the Defendant, Chad C. McKie, 
date o  was in actual physical control of and was driving a 
vehicle, in the bicycle lane, westbound on Boise Ave. near Beacon St. in Boise, 
Ada County, Idaho, which is a publicly maintained roadway and open to the 
public. 
2. As he drove he was wobbling in his lane and the tail light of the vehicle was not 
functioning properly. 
3. A traffic stop was initiated by Officer Adam Schloegel of the Boise Police 
Department. Officer Schloegel observed what he perceived to be signs of 
intoxication exhibited by the Defendant. 
4. The vehicle driven by the Defendant is a self-propelled vehicle as defined by 
Idaho Code 49-123(h). 
5. The vehicle driven by the Defendant is a moped as defined by Idaho Code 49-
114(M)(9). It is a limited-speed motor-driven cycle having both motorized and 
pedal propulsion that is not capable of propelling the vehicle at a speed in excess 
of thirty (30) miles per hour on level ground, with two (2) wheels in contact with 
the ground during operation. Its internal combustion engine does not exceed fifty 
(50) cubic centimeters in displacement, and its power drive system functions 
directly or automatically without clutching or shifting by the operator after the 
drive system is engaged. 
6. The moped driven by the Defendant was neither titled nor registered. 
The Statutory amendments stemming from the 2008 legislation identified m LC. §49-
114(M)(9), established the exclusionary language from which a moped qualifies under I.C §49-
123(V)(2)(h), excluded from "motor vehicle", as a moped is not titled, and provides no 
registration requirement, as discussed herein. 
The legislature determines what mode of movement is to be titled and registered, and the 
legislature made clear mopeds are not "titled" and the Senate Committee, on March 8, 2008, 
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declared they are not "registered", as a "moped" is excluded and exempted by the effects of the 
2008 Legislative amendments that a moped is not "titled", and not be "registered", under Idaho 
law. 
VI. 
ISSUE PRESENTED ON APPEAL: 
Whether the District Court erred when declaring a "moped" to be a 
"motor vehicle" for purposes of the DUI laws, disregarding the amendments 
made by the Idaho Legislature in 2008 to Title 49, Statutes of the State of 
Idaho, exempting a "moped" from titling requirements, and excluding that 
mode of movement from a "motor vehicle" under Idaho law. 
VII. 
ARGUMENT 
Whether the District Court erred when declaring a "moped" to be a 
"motor vehicle" for purposes of the DUI laws, disregarding the amendments 
made by the Idaho Legislature in 2008 to Title 49, Statutes of the State of 
Idaho, exempting a "moped" from titling requirements, and excluding that 
mode of movement from a "motor vehicle" under Idaho law. 
(a). WHAT CONSTITUTES A "MOTOR VEHICLE" UNDER IDAHO LAW 
The lower district court failed to apply the exclusionary language contained within the 
Idaho statutes that specifically relates to "mopeds", an issue not addressed in Trusdall, supra, as 
the subject of "moped" and its statutory exemption was not the issue in Trusdall, and why 
Trusdall found need to resort to "self-propelled" when a "UTV" is defined to be a motor vehicle 
(I. C. §67-7101(17)) is, in itself, an interesting element to ponder, as a UTV, being a motor 
vehicle by specific definition, is not exempted or excluded by the language in I. C. §67-
7101 (17), statutorily defined in LC. §67-7101(17), in the following manner: 
(17) "Utility type vehicle" or "UTV" means any recreational motor 
vehicle other than an ATV, motorbike or snowmobile as defined in this section, 
designed for and capable of travel over designated roads, traveling on four ( 4) or 
more tires, maximum width less than seventy-four (74) inches, maximum weight 
less than two thousand (2,000) pounds, and having a wheelbase of one hundred 
ten (110) inches or less. A utility type vehicle must have a minimum width of fifty 
(50) inches, a minimum weight of at least nine hundred (900) pounds or a 
wheelbase of over sixty-one (61) inches. Utility type vehicle does not include 
golf carts, vehicles specially designed to carry a disabled person, implements of 
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husbandry as defined in section 49-110(2), Idaho Code, or vehicles otherwise 
registered under title 49, Idaho Code. A "utility type vehicle" or "UTV" also 
means a recreational off-highway vehicle or ROV. (Emphasis ours). 
This appeal should be resolved by application of the Legislature's definition of what is 
excluded from "motor vehicle", the essence of which the district court declined to address in its 
analysis. The 2008 Legislative amendments employed specific language and careful consistency 
throughout their various definitions of various modes of movement, expressing consistently by 
the exclusion of "mopeds" from "motor vehicle", since they are non-titled. 
The classification of a "motor vehicle", when reviewing these comprehensive statutory 
enactments within the series of Legislative amendments in 2008 to motorcycles, motorbikes etc., 
which demonstrates the painful effort the legislature took when declaring specific exclusions to 
the definition of "motor vehicle", and maintaining consistency throughout those definitions, is 
what becomes relevant to this case, as Appellant was operating a mode of movement within this 
exclusionary language from what a "Motor Vehicle" is defined to be under Idaho law. 
In re-defining "motor vehicle", in 2008 the Legislature enacted specific amendments to 
LC. §49-123(V), with full knowledge of the DUI criminal statute identified in LC. §18-8004, to 
then include part (2)(h), thereby adding specific exclusionary aspects to the definition of motor 
vehicle, so as to confirm certain vehicles [ modes of movement ]are specifically exempted, from 
· what is defined to be a motor vehicle, which I.C. §49-123(V)(2)(h) therein states: 
"Motor vehicle" does not include vehicles that moved solely by human 
power, electric personal assistive mobility devices, motorized wheelchairs, or 
other such vehicles that are specifically exempt from titling "or" registration 
requirements under Title 49, Idaho Code. (Emphasis ours.). 
I.C. §49-123(V)(2)(h), highlighted for the convenience, provides as follows: 
49-123. DEFINITIONS -- V. 
(1) ..... 
(2) "Vehicle" means: 
(h) Motor vehicle. Every vehicle which is self-propelled, and for the purpose of 
titling and registration meets federal motor vehicle safety standards as defined in 
section 49-107, Idaho Code. Motor vehicle does not include vehicles moved 
solely by human power, electric personal assistive mobility devices and 
motorized wheelchairs OR OTHER SUCH VEHICLES THAT ARE 
SPECIFICALLY EXEMPT FROM TITLING OR REGISTRATION 
REQUIREMENTS UNDER TITLE 49, IDAHO CODE. (Emphasis ours) 
With respect to the exemption of "mopeds", I.C. §49-114, through the inclusion of the 
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amendment, Sub-Part (M)(9), specifically excludes "mopeds" from titling requirements, so they 
are among those vehicles that are exempted by LC. §49-123(V)(2)(h), and the relevant portion of 
this exclusionary provision that incorporates the titling exemption, is LC. §49-114(M)(9), with 
relevant portion highlighted for convenience, states the following: 
49-114. DEFINITIONS --M. 
(9) "Moped" means a limited-speed MOTOR-DRIVEN CYCLE having: 
(a) Both motorized and pedal propulsion that is not capable of propelling the 
vehicle at a speed in excess of thirty (30) miles per hour on level ground, 
whether two (2) or three (3) wheels are in contact with the ground during 
operation. If an internal combustion engine is used, the displacement shall not 
exceed fifty (50) cubic centimeters and the moped shall have a power drive 
system that functions directly or automatically without clutching or shifting by 
the operator after the drive system is engaged; or 
(b) Two (2) wheels or three (3) wheels with no pedals, which is powered solely by 
electrical energy, has an automatic transmission, a motor which produces less 
than two (2) gross brake horsepower, is capable of propelling the device at a 
maximum speed of not more than thirty (30) miles per hour on level ground and 
as originally manufactured, meets federal motor vehicle safety standards for 
motor-driven cycles. A MOPED IS NOT REQUIRED TO BE TITLED AND 
NO MOTORCYCLE ENDORSEMENT IS REQUIRED FOR ITS 
OPERATOR. 
A moped is defined differently from other wheeled transport modes, excluded from other 
related definitions because other modes are either titled or defined to be a "motor vehicle", as 
highlighted and identified below: 
(10) "Motorbike" means a vehicle as defined in section 67-7101, Idaho 
Code. Such vehicle SHALL BE TITLED and MAY BE APPROVED FOR 
MOTORCYCLE REGISTRATION pursuant to section 49-402, Idaho Code, upon 
certification by the owner of the installation and use of conversion components 
that make the motorbike COMPLIANT WITH federal motor vehicle safety 
standards. 
(11) "Motorcycle" means every MOTOR VEHICLE having a seat or 
saddle for the use of the rider, designed to travel on not more than three (3) 
wheels in contact with the ground or designed to travel on two (2) wheels in 
contact with the ground which is modified by the addition of two (2) stabilizing 
wheels on the rear of the motor vehicle, that meets the federal motor vehicle 
safety standards as originally designed, and includes a converted motorbike, BUT 
DOES NOT INCLUDE A motor-driven cycle, a motorbike, a tractor or a 
MOPED. 
(12) ..... 
(13) "MOTOR-DRIVEN CYCLE" means a CYCLE with a motor that 
· produces five (5) brake horsepower or less as originally manufactured that meets 
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federal motor vehicle safety standards as originally designed, AND DOES NOT 
INCLUDE MOPEDS. Such vehicle shall be titled and a motorcycle endorsement 
is required for its operation. 
(14) ..... 
(15) "Motorized wheelchair" means a MOTOR VEHICLE with a speed 
not in excess of eight (8) miles per hour, designed for and used by a person with a 
disability. 
(16) ..... 
(17) "Motor vehicle." (See "Vehicle," section 49-123, Idaho Code) 
(18) "Motor vehicle liability policy" means an owner's or operator's policy 
of liability insurance, certified as provided in section 49-1210, Idaho Code, as 
proof of financial responsibility, and issued by an insurance carrier duly 
authorized to transact business in this state, to or for the benefit of the person 
named therein as insured. 
(19) "Motor vehicle record" means any record that pertains to a motor 
vehicle registration, motor vehicle title or identification documents or other 
similar credentials issued by the department or other state or local agency. (All 
emphasis ours). 
To assist in this statutory analysis is the prior Idaho Supreme Court Decision in 2006, 
whereby our appellate court addressed the concept of moped, and specifically recognized it had 
exempt status in California, as identified in a California case cited within the Idaho's Decision 
rendered in 2006, while discussing what is and what is not a motor vehicle. This issue was 
addressed in Armstrong v. Farmers Ins. Co. of Idaho, 143 Idaho 135, 139 P.3d 737 (May 25, 
2006), wherein the Idaho Supreme Court stated: 
"At issue in Galvin was a provision excluding coverage for injuries 
sustained by a person occupying a motor vehicle owned by the insured but not 
covered in the policy. A father had obtained coverage for his 1979 Dodge, hut not 
his moped, and his son was injured while riding the moped. The father contended 
that the exclusion for other owned motor vehicles did not apply to the moped 
because it was not a motor vehicle. The Galvin court agreed, relying upon the 
facts that mopeds were designed to he propelled by pedaling in addition to their 
motors; that they were exempt from registration under the Vehicle Code; and 
that while motorcycles were defined as being motor vehicles under the Vehicle 
Code, mopeds were not. It stated that while a motorcycle had been held to he 
motor vehicle under a similar exclusionary clause, "the implied analogy between 
mopeds and motorcycles is tenuous and cannot he relied upon as the basis for 
finding that a moped is a motor vehicle." 170 Cal.App.3d at 1022, 216 Cal.Rptr. 
at 846. The instant case involves a motorcycle, not a moped. A motorcycle is 
defined as a motor vehicle under the Idaho motor vehicle code. LC. § 49-
114(10)." (Now I.C. § 49-114(m)(l 1), after 2008. (Emphasis ours) 
The current statutory citation for motorcycle, after the 2008 Legislative amendments, is 
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found in LC. §49-114(M)(ll), and excludes mopeds from the definition of motorcycle. The 
statute, defining motorcycles, now provides as follows: 
(11) "Motorcycle" means every motor vehicle having a seat or saddle for 
the use of the rider, designed to travel on not more than three (3) wheels in 
contact with the ground or designed to travel on two (2) wheels in contact with 
the ground which is modified by the addition of two (2) stabilizing wheels on the 
rear of the motor vehicle, that meets the federal motor vehicle safety standards as 
originally designed, and includes a converted motorbike, BUT DOES NOT 
INCLUDE a motor-driven cycle, a motorbike, a tractor or a MOPED. (Emphasis 
ours) 
The discussion within Armstrong, supra, focused upon the definition of "motorcycle", 
"motor vehicle", and California's exclusion of a "moped" as a moped was defined under 
California law to be excluded from "motor vehicle". What Idaho's definition of motorcycle back 
in 2006 was then identified in LC. §49-114(10), and now identified in LC. §49-114(M)(ll)). 
When the Idaho Legislature took the initiative in 2008 to amend definitions of various vehicles 
and modes of movement, it embraced aspects of California law, and Idaho's analysis in 
Armstrong, supra would now indicate that Idaho's Legislature embraced the California 
definition(s), and Idaho expressly excluded mopeds from "motor vehicle" and a moped no 
longer to be regarded a motor vehicle under Idaho law. To illustrate that point rather precisely, 
the legislature undertook to define a moped separately in (M)(9), referred to as a "limited speed, 
motor driven cycle", not titled, having no motorcycle endorsement requirements, and excluded 
from "motor vehicles", "motorcycle" and "motorbike" by specifically declaring they are not 
titled. 
These statutory exemptions cannot be ignored or disregarded by the courts, and must be 
taken into account in the process of statutory interpretation, as it was not "superfluous" 
language when specifically exempting moped from motor vehicle because they are not titled 
cycles. 
"Mopeds" are very different from other two wheeled modes of movement, and quite to 
the contrary, are never used for off road recreational activities, being grossly underpowered and 
travel slowly on city streets. 
Mopeds have an engine 50cc's or less, not "geared" for high speed, moving slower that 
30 mph, and typically has a slip clutch, lever activated or foot activated, or automatically 
activated in conjunction with the rotation of the wheel-engine revolution, and the engine is 
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designed for a pedal/chain start so you can start the engine while riding and pedaling the bike. 
The typical speed that can be achieved on a moped "motorized bike" is usually between 20 and 
25 mph, as it has very limited speed potential because of the very small cylinder displacement, 
and the limited horse power available, together with the weight of the bike itself and the weight 
of the rider, all of which weight friction limits the forward movement capabilities. The chain 
drive mechanism typically requires a sprocket reduction on the rear wheel assembly, and during 
prior test runs conducted with this moped, while being operated by this Defendant, his maximum 
speed was less than 25 mph, even on a slope, as the weight of the rider, the friction and drag 
caused through the moving parts from the limited engine output, as it transitions to the chain, to 
the sprocket, and to the friction of the road surface against the tire, consumes all the torque and 
power output generated. 
(b). PRIOR JUDICIAL DETERMINATION OF "MOPEDS" UNDER IDAHO'S 
MOTOR VEHICLE LAWS 
The operation of a moped, in Ada County, was decided in another case involving the 
question whether a driver's license was required to operate a moped. 
That issue was addressed in the criminal case entitled State of Idaho v. Elijah c. Udeochu, 
Case NO. CR-MD-2011-0005485 (4th District Court, Ada County, 2011). The focus in that case was 
the definition of "Motor Vehicle", given the recent amendments in 2008. 
That case brought forth a decision from Ada County Magistrate, the Honorable Michael 
J. Oths, wherein that Magistrate declared mopeds are specifically exempt from "titling" 
requirements, and Idaho law specifically states vehicles specifically exempt from titling or 
registering requirements, and are not "motor vehicles", as defined within Title 49, Idaho Code. 
The court went on to reason that a statutory requirement in Idaho, requiring an operator of a 
"Motor Vehicle" to have a driver's license, is an issue governed by Title 49, Chapter 3, and if the 
mode of transportation (moped) is not a "motor vehicle", then a driver's license is not required for 
its operation. The requirement for a "Motor Vehicle" Driver's License is contained in I.C. §49-
301, whichprovides: 
No person, except those expressly exempted by the prov1s10ns of this 
chapter, shall drive any motor vehicle upon a highway unless the person has a 
current and valid Idaho driver's license. 
Judge Oths concluded in his Order that: 
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"a moped is specifically exempt from titling requirements, that vehicles 
that are specifically exempt from titling are not 'motor vehicles,' and that a 
moped is thus not a motor vehicle. Therefore, a driver's license is not required to 
operate a moped on a public highway, nor is liability insurance required. A 
lingering question remains as to whether it is possible to legally operate a moped 
on a public highway. Trying to read all of the statutes in concert is a daunting 
task, but it appears there is a way to legally ride a moped on a public highway. 
Idaho Code §49-402(10) prohibits registration of a vehicle for use on public 
highways unless it meets federal safety standards. Presumably if a moped were to 
meet the federal standards it could be registered and/or used on a public highway. 
Nothing would require the vehicle to be titled, nor would the operator need to be 
licensed ... Should this matter proceed to trial, jury instructions consistent with 
the above opinion would be given." Order Re: Defendant's Motion to Dismiss, at 
4-5. 
It was that very Order rendered in the Udeochu case Appellant relied when constructing 
his moped, pursuant to the statutory definitions within Idaho's 2008 Legislative amendments, and rode 
that moped rather than operate a "motor vehicle", when he might consume any alcoholic beverages, 
following his prior experience and prior encounter with the law. 
Appellant "slow-moving", "limited-speed", "motor-driven cycle" was constructed 
precisely as described within the statute to be a "moped", having blended parts of an old 
discarded bicycle frame with parts of a Honda Trail bike frame, incorporating into it the 
component palis of a bike peddling mechanism and a small engine, with the required staliing and 
operation process. The engine was a small 49 cc single cylinder gas engine, following the criteria 
in the statute, less than the 50 cc maximum size. This bike-motor combination, being a "moped", 
was comparable to the conversion kits available through several bike shops in the Boise Valley. 
These "kits" are referenced to as "motorized bikes", which commercial kits are available on the 
market, featuring the small engine, usually a 41cc to a 49 cc, and called "Motor Bicycle", and 
these kits are called a "Motorized Bike Gas Engine Assembly Kit". 
Quite often, a moped is referred to as a "motorized bicycle", and although that is 
physically descriptive, the Legislature used the name "moped" when the provisions of LC. § 49-
114(M)(9) (a)&(b) were enacted, and the exclusions announced in LC. §49-123(V)(2)(h), 
defining what is a Motor vehicle, and what is not a motor vehicle. 
The exception to "motor vehicle", is expressed in LC. § 49-123(V)(2)(h): 
"(h) ......... Motor vehicle does not include vehicles moved solely by human 
power, electric personal assistive mobility devices and motorized wheelchairs 
or other such vehicles that are specifically exempt from titling or registration 
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requirements under title 49, Idaho Code." (Emphasis ours). 
Appellant's case, just like the Udeochu case, involves a "moped", by legal definition, 
precisely constructed as defined and described within the statute, and in Udeochu, that 
Magistrate declared "mopeds" are not "motor vehicles", as a matter of Idaho law, and could not 
subject an operator to criminal acts associated with operation of"motor vehicles". 
The district court, in ruling upon Appellant's appeal, should have applied the 
exclusionary language, and not stop at the words "self-propelled", as courts are bound to accept 
the plain, ordinary, and unambiguous language used by the Legislature in their statutory 
definitions, to and including exclusions and exceptions, and a vehicle specifically "excluded" 
from the definition of "motor vehicle", as statutorily declared, is binding on the courts, and our 
Lower District Court was in error when deciding to call a "moped" a "motor vehicle", merely 
because it had a "self-propelled" component by vi1iue of a small single cylinder 49cc engine, 
having very limited speed, and clearly not a motor vehicle as the courts have declared UTVs, 
ATVs, motorcycles, motorbikes, and snowmobiles, etc. to be. Despite being modestly and 
somewhat self-propelled, a moped 1s specifically exempt from titling or registration 
requirements under title 49, Idaho Code. 
For a district court to affirm a magistrate's finding, contrary to the exclusionary language 
within LC. §49-123(V)(2)(h), and applies to mopeds by the defining words in LC. § 49-
114(M)(9) (a)&(b), constitutes fundamental error. The Legislative enactments require all courts 
to apply the entire exclusionary statutory language, and given the plain and ordinary meaning 
expressed thereby, when specific language is used to expressly state what a motor vehicle is 
defined not to be, the exclusionary effects require a lower court to apply all language, so it is not 
left to be "superfluous", and that requires the application of all exceptions to the definition, 
which this 2008 Legislature clearly and unambiguously undertook to accomplish, expressly 
excluding various forms of slow moving, limited speed, motor driven cycles, irrespective of 
being "somewhat" "self-propelled" when declaring them to be exempt from titling and/or 
registration mandates, as a "moped", is not to be titled/registered, and declared excluded. 
(c). THE LAW ON "MOPEDS" and "MOTOR VEHICLES" 
The fundamental issue before this court is not whether a "moped" has a component in 
being somewhat "self-propelled", but rather the recognition a "moped" has been defined as a slow 
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moving, limited speed, motor driven cycle excluded from the definition of "motor vehicle" 
because it is exempted from titling through the Legislative amendments of 2008. 
As stated previously, the Lower Court embraced the Trusdall limited analysis of "self-
propelling" and that brought an end to the conversation. UTV's, the only subject discussed in that 
case, is not excluded from "motor vehicle", and more accurately stated, a UTV was statutorily 
defined to be a recreational motor vehicle. This abbreviated focus of our lower court has served 
to perpetuate this controversy, as UTV s are different from mopeds, not excluded from titling 
requirements. 
A UTV has an engine displacement greater than 500 cc's, exceeding more than ten (10) 
times allowable cc's for a moped, potentially able to attain high speeds, well exceeding 30 mph. 
Without belaboring the point, a UTV is not a "moped", and a UTV is defined to be a "motor 
vehicle" within I. C. §67-7101(17), so our district court's reference to Trusdall, supra, lacks the 
analysis of the statutory exclusions of "mopeds", which clearly are not UTV s, ATVs, a 
motorcycle, a motorbike, or a snowmobile, and the plain and ordinary language used to 
specifically exclude mopeds from titling requirements excludes mopeds from "motor vehicles", 
and the statutes are unambiguous from the legislative effects adopted through the 2008 Legislative 
amendments. 
(d). STATUTORY INTREPRETATION AND CASE HISTORY 
In prior years, the Idaho Supreme Court recognized that Title 18, Chapter 80, (Statutes of 
the State of Idaho) did not have any definition of the phrase "motor vehicle" with which to use in 
the application of LC.§ 18-8004, Idaho's DUI laws. Therefore, in State v. Carpenter, 113 Idaho 
882, 749 P. 2d 501 (1988) and State v. Lopez, 133 Idaho 378, 987 P. 2d 290 (1999), the Appellate 
Courts relied upon Title 49 of the Idaho statutes, where they identified the only established 
definition for "motor vehicle", and the Supreme Court used that definition for Title 18, Chapter 80 
criminal matters. The appellate courts relied upon Title 49 then, and that remains the case 
thereafter, and when the amendments were made to Title 49 by the Legislature in 2008, those 
amendments affected the only definition of the phrase "motor vehicle", and within those 2008 
amendments, certain exclusions were then adopted by the Legislature, the effect of which has 
expressly served to exclude certain modes of movement from the definition of "motor vehicle". 
Thusly, Carpenter and Barnes established the law as to where Courts go to find out what 
the Legislature has chosen to define "motor vehicle" to be, and it remains true today the only 
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definition to be applied to Title 18 is that as it is expressed within Title 49, and that constitutes the 
definition of what is, and what is not, a "Motor Vehicle" for application to Idaho law, including 
Title 18, Statutes of the State ofldaho. All Idaho lower courts must accept the Title 49 definition, 
and must apply the exclusionary language the Legislature has chosen to declare therein. 
Additionally as it was stated in State v. Knott, 132 Idaho 476, 974P.2d1105 (1999): 
"There is a close interaction between the Title 49 statutes and similar 
statutory provisions in Title 18, particularly the DUI provision found in section 
18-8004. The statutes relate to the same subject matter and on occasions have 
been addressed by the legislature at the same time. 132 Idaho at 479, 974 P.2d at 
1008". 
It was in 1984 that the DUI statute was transferred from Title 49 to Title 18, and the 
Court concluded that when identical terms are used in both sections, they should be construed by 
reference to the common definitions provided in the Code: 
Idaho Code § 73-113 [now I.C. § 73-113(3)] indicates that words and 
phrases used in the Idaho Code are to be "construed according to the context and 
approved usage of the language." Given that identical terms are used in the 
statutes, and the legislature amended the relevant phrase to statutes in both Title 
49 and Title 18 in the same bill after the DUI statute was transferred to the 
criminal code, the "context and approved usage" of the relevant phrase indicates 
that its meaning is the same in both titles. 132 Idaho at 479, 974 P.2d at 1008 
(bracketed reference to change in statutory citation added). 
The 2008 statutory amendments distinguished various vehicles and modes of movement, 
and particularly in the category of "titled" vehicles and modes of movement, a moped is no 
longer to be titled, and was withdrawn from what was a "motor vehicle". After 2008, a "moped" 
is neither a "motorcycle" nor a "motor bike", as they also are defined separately. A motorcycle 
and a motorbike are "titled" and "registered" vehicles, while mopeds are not titled, and according 
to the Senate Transportation Committee, mopeds were not thereafter intended to be registered, 
according to their Senate Minutes in 2008. Mopeds were specifically excluded because they were 
considered "slow moving, limited speed, motor driven cycles", with a motor displacement under 
50 cc in size, unable to attain 30 mph, has pedals to start and capable of being operated solely 
with those pedals (thereby human driven) and has the limited assistance of the small motor/engine 
( electrical or internal combustion) that has insignificant power output. 
The 2008 Statutory Amendments should be held to control this controversy, and it was 
within the Legislature's exclusive right (as the legislative branch· of government) to adopt 
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exclusions and exemptions to their definition of "motor vehicle", and the courts are bound to 
enforce what the Legislature adopted in 2008, and our Lower Courts are bound to give meaning 
and application of the Legislative branch exclusions and exceptions, as they were not meant to be 
or become superfluous amendments. 
I.C. §49-123(V)(2)(h) adopted exclusions to "motor vehicle", and I.C. §49-114(M)(9)(b) 
identified "moped among those exclusions by specifically exempting them from "titling or 
registration" under I. C. §49-114(M)(9)(b ), and "specifically authorized" their operation on Idaho 
roads by the language in (M)(9)(b ), authorizing the "operator" of a "moped" to "operate" it 
"without a motorcycle endorsement", as a "moped" is not a motorcycle, as then being defined. 
On March 6, 2008, the Senate Transportation Committee minutes indicated mopeds will 
not be required to be registered because people use them "in town" and they are not a 
"highway" vehicle. The distinction of "in town", from "highway" use supports the awareness and 
discussions the legislature had concerning their new definition and their intended usage. 
The Idaho Senators recognized "mopeds" are to be "operated" "in town", and to that end, 
a "fact" stipulated to by the Parties was that Appellant was cited while operating his moped along 
Boise Avenue in the City of Boise in the "bike lane", where you would expect to find a two 
wheel, slow moving means of movement, travelling along a roadway in "town". 
There are a series of cases that before addressed the process of statutory construction and 
interpretation, which Appellant will undertake to discuss in the course of this Opening Brief. 
The general rules of statutory interpretation have recently been summarized in Hoffer v. 
Shappard, 160 Idaho 870,380 P.3d 681 (2016), stating the following: 
"The objective of statutory interpretation is to give effect to legislative 
intent." State v. Yzaguirre, 144 Idaho 471, 475, 163 P.3d 1183, 1187 (2007). 
"When interpreting a statute, the Court begins with the literal words of the statute . 
. . . " Williams v. Blue Cross of Idaho, 151 Idaho 515, 521, 260 P.3d 1186, 1192 
(2011). "If the statutory language is unambiguous, the clearly expressed intent of 
the legislative body must be given effect. ... " Idaho Youth Ranch, Inc. v. Ada 
Cnty. Bd. of Equalization, 157 Idaho 180, 184-85, 335 P.3d 25, 29-30 (2014) 
(internal quotations omitted) ( quoting St. Luke's Reg' l Med. Ctr., Ltd. v. Bd. of 
Comm 'rs of Ada Cnty., 146 Idaho 753, 755, 203 P.3d 683, 685 (2009)). This 
Court does not have the authority to modify an unambiguous legislative 
enactment. Verska v. Saint Alphonsus Reg' l Med. Ctr., 151 Idaho 889, 895, 265 
P.3d 502, 508 (2011) (quoting Berry v. Koehler, 84 Idaho 170, 177, 369 P.2d 
1010, 1013 (1962)). 
160 Idaho at 884, 380 P.3d at 695. 
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As addressed hereinabove, when a criminal statute is exposed to legitimate differences of 
opinion with respect to the interpretation of statutory language defining a criminal act, that 
serves to create a concern the statute may be constitutionally :flawed and vague. See State v. 
Lopez, 98 Idaho 581, 570 P.2d 259 (1976), (wherein a statute was held unconstitutionally vague, 
because it did not define the terms used in the statute, nor apprise the defendant what conduct 
violated the statute and became a criminal act). If a criminal statute is determined to be 
ambiguous, the "rule oflenity," applies, as stated in State v. Alley, 155 Idaho 972, 318 P .3d 962 
(Ct.App.2014), where the Idaho Court of Appeals held: 
Additionally, if a criminal statute is ambiguous, the rule of lenity applies 
and the statute must be construed in favor of the accused. State v. Dewey, 131 
Idaho 846, 848, 965 P.2d 206, 208 (Ct.App.1998); State v. Martinez, 126 Idaho 
801, 803, 891 P.2d 1061, 1063 (Ct.App.1995). However, where a review of the 
legislative history makes the meaning of the statute clear, the rule of lenity will 
not be applied. State v. Bradshaw, 155 Idaho 437, 440, 313 P.3d 765, 768 
(Ct.App.2013); State v. Jones, 151 Idaho 943, 947, 265 P.3d 1155, 1159 
(Ct.App.2011). The rule of lenity applies only when grievous ambiguity or 
uncertainty in a criminal statute that is not resolved by looking at the text, context, 
legislative history, or underlying policy of the statute allows for multiple 
reasonable constructions. Bradshaw, 155 Idaho at 441,313 P.3d at 769. 
155 Idaho at 976,318 P.3d at 966. 
It is disfavored to cause a statute to be declared vague and unconstitutional. An essential 
element of a DUI offense, however, as identified in Idaho Criminal Jury Instruction 1000, is the 
requirement the accused must drive or be in actual physical control of ( 4) a motor vehicle, and If 
any of the above has not been proven beyond a reasonable doubt, the jury must find the 
defendant not guilty. 
If any single element is absent (in this instance the operation of a "Motor vehicle"), the 
charge must be dismissed or the defendant acquitted. In criminal matters, the law requires the 
state to prove every element of the offense charged beyond a reasonable doubt. In re Winship, 
397 U.S. 358 (1970); State v. Felder, 150 Idaho 269, 274, 245 P.3d 1021, 1026 (Ct.App. 2010) 
("The requirement that the State prove every element of a crime beyond a reasonable doubt is 
grounded in the constitutional guarantee of due process. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 313-
14, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 2786, 61 L.Ed.2d 560, 569-70 (1979); State v. Mubita, 145 Idaho 925, 942, 
188 P.3d 867, 884 (2008); Erickson, 148 Idaho at 685, 227 P.3d at 939. This standard of proof 
plays a vital role in the American scheme of criminal procedure because it provides concrete 
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substance for the presumption of innocence-that bedrock axiomatic and elementary principle 
whose enforcement lies at the foundation of the administration of our criminal law. In re 
Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 363, 90 S.Ct. 1068, 1072, 25 L.Ed.2d 368, 374-75 (1970); Erickson, 148 
Idaho at 685,227 P.3d at 939." (Emphasis ours)). 
The question presented throughout this appeal is whether the required element of a 
"motor vehicle" exists as a proven element in this case, since, as a matter of law, a "moped" is 
not a "motor vehicle" as it is exempted from titling, and specifically declared excluded from the 
definition of "motor vehicle." 
The district court expressed concern with Appellants reference to the application of the 
"rule of lenity", stating that rule was not raised as an issue below in the magistrate court, and 
whether that be a correct interpretation as to the requirement for preserving the application of the 
rule of lenity on this appeal, it would appear the "rule of lenity" is a consequential doctrine to be 
applied, once there has been a statutory interpretation that determines the presence of statutory 
ambiguity, and it has no application until that has been determined. The rule would be justly 
applied if the statute is found to be lacking in clarity or is ambiguous in its content. 
Appellant has pursued this appeal because of the clear expressions the Legislature used in 
their effort to exclude a "moped" from the definition of "motor vehicle", adopting exceptions 
and re-defining numerous modes of transportation, with careful and consistent recital of words 
within the legislature's choice of language, and the statutes' express modification by the new 
phrase "or other such vehicles that are specifically exempt from titling "or" registration 
requirements under Title 49, Idaho Code" regarding the definition of what is not a motor 
vehicle (I. C. §49-123(V)(2)(h)), and declaring that a moped is defined to be among those "non-
titled" (I. C. §49-114(M)(9)). This legislative exclusion is clear and unambiguous, but should 
this appellate court find it to be otherwise, and determine the statutory codification is somehow 
ambiguous because this non-titled mode of movement is still somewhat "self-propelled", then 
the application of the rule of lenity should be given its consequential effect and result that 
follows from an appellate court's finding a statute is not clear or ambiguous, as this is a criminal 
statute that requires the presence of a "motor vehicle", and either a moped is excluded, like the 
Legislature specifically intended it to be, or the statutory definition is un-clear and ambiguous, 
because the lower courts are attempting to consider a moped differently than the legislature 
intended it to be treated under their adoption of Idaho law. 
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It does not necessarily follow logic to say that the "rule of lenity" has to be raised and 
preserved as an issue in the lower court, when there has yet to be a determination the issue of the 
statutory interpretation, which is the issue raised by the effects on this appeal. To argue that the 
rule of lenity must first be raised and preserved would logically appear to be placing the cart 
before the horse, having no purpose or application until there is a determination as to the 
legislative intent when enacting the amending statutes, where the Legislature intended to carve 
out the exceptions to motor vehicle, just as California has done years before. 
The Idaho Supreme Court recently held in Peterson v. Peterson, 156 Idaho 85, 320 P.3d 
1244 (2014), that under Idaho's Constitution, the operative authority for the declaration of the 
enactment of laws by the Idaho Legislature is the annual compilation known as the Idaho Session 
laws, and while the Court observes that commercially published compilations of the Idaho code 
to be merely "evidence" of the Idaho statutes, the Idaho Code does not represent the law itself. 
("' All general laws enacted at any session of the legislature shall be printed in a volume known 
as the Session Laws.' LC.§ 67-904(1)). Immediately after the session laws are printed, they are 
delivered to the Secretary of State for distribution and sale. LC.§ 67-906." 156 Idaho at 88,320 
P.3d at 1247. "Thus, the compilation of statutes in the Idaho Code is merely evidence of the laws 
enacted by the legislature as set forth in the session laws. The Idaho Code is not the law." 157 
Idaho at 90, 320 P.3d at 1249). 
As a consequence of this ruling, the Supreme Court must take judicial notice of the 
session laws, and thusly, there will be a separate motion submitted to this appellate court, 
following presentation of Appellant's Opening Brief, requesting this appellate court take judicial 
notice of the 2008 session laws, relevant to the issues surrounding this motor vehicle code raised 
on this appeal, and the legislative history that accompanies the enactment of those 2008 
amendments. On appeal, an appellate court may take judicial notice of any matter on which the 
court of original jurisdiction could take judicial notice. City of Lewiston v. Frary, 91 Idaho 322, 
325-27, 420 P.2d 805, 808-10 (1966); LC. § 9-101; I.R.E. 201. See also, Crawford v. 
Department of Correction, 133 Idaho 633, 636 n. 1, 991 P.2d 358, 361 n. 1 (1999) ("We take 
judicial notice of House Bill 73, which was not submitted as part of the record on appeal, but is 
contained in the public records maintained by the Office of Legislative Services located in the 
State Capitol Building. LR.E. 201(±). Appellant requests this court engage such judicial notice, to 
be assured of the precise language used by the Idaho Legislature when they undertook the 2008 
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amendments. 
An "interpretative" approach, in reviewing the statutory amendments enacted in 2008, 
may focus upon how this court will construe the phrase "or other such vehicles that are 
specifically exempt from titling "or" registration requirements under Title 4 9, Idaho Code" . 
. There are various principles considered in statutory construction. 
In Pepple v. Headrick, 64 Idaho 132, 128 P.2d 757 (1942), the court interpreted a 
gaming-gambling statute. The court addressed an interpretative doctrine, then set aside that 
analysis in construing the language in the statute. In that case, the court held the doctrine 
inapplicable, and went beyond what otherwise was that limiting doctrine, stating: 
1. Under the "ejusdem generis" doctrine, where general words of the statute 
follow an enumeration of persons or things, the general words will be construed 
as meaning persons or things of like or similar class or character to those 
specifically enumerated. 
2. The rule of "ejusdem generis" is merely a rule of construction and does 
not warrant a court in confining the operation of a statute within narrower 
limits than intended by the legislature. 
3. In construing statute making it a misdemeanor to operate certain 
enumerated gambling devices or "any other device" employed in gambling, 
the "ejusdem generis" doctrine was inapplicable, and the prohibition of the 
statute was not limited to devices similar to those enumerated. (LC.A., sec. 
17-2301; Const., art. 3, sec. 20.) 64 Idaho 133. (Emphasis ours) 
That com1 then stated: 
"Statutes which are in their nature penal are strictly construed and should 
not be held to include anything not clearly and plainly within the scope of their 
provisions. (59 C.J., sec. 660, p. 1113; In re Dampier, Supra; State v. Choate, 41 
Idaho 251; In re Moore, 38 Idaho 506.) 
It is a universally recognized rule of construction that where a statute 
specifies certain things upon which it is to operate or forbids certain things, it is to 
be construed as excluding from its effect all those not expressly mentioned. (59 
C.J., sec. 582, p. 984; 25 R.C.L., sec. 229, p. 989; State v. Gossett, 113 P.2d 415; 
Peckv. State of Idaho, 120 P.2d 820.) 
Where general words such as "other" or "any other" follow an 
enumeration of particular classes, such words are construed as applicable only to 
things of a like kind or nature to those enumerated. (59 C.J., sec. 581, p. 981; In re 
Hull, Supra; Denver v. Taylor (Colo.), 292 P. 594, 73 A.LR. 833; Ex parte 
Williams (Cal.), 87 P. 565; Kirkley v. Portland Electric Power Co., 298 P. 
237.) ..... . 
The doctrine of ejusdem generis refers to a similarity of character or substance and 
not to a similarity of form. (State v. Hull, supra.), (Emphasis ours) 
The court then stated: 
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The act before us now contains no word of limitation or modification and 
does not pretend to limit its prohibitive terms to only such games and devices as 
previously enumerated, but places a prohibition on "any other device," 
employed in gaming and gambling ..... . 
We recognize and have often invoked the rule of construction that, where 
general words of a statute follow an enumeration of persons or things, such 
general words will be construed as meaning persons or things of like or similar 
class or character to those specially enumerated; usually designated the "ejusdem 
generis" rule. (In re Winton Lumber Co., 57 Idaho 131, 135, 63 P.2d 664; 28 
C.J.S., p. 1049.) 
"This rule is but one of construction and does not warrant a court in 
confining the operation of a statute within narrower limits than intended by 
the legislature." (Commonwealth v. Klucher, 326 Pa. 587, 193 A. 28.) 
In the case before us, the legislature evidently did not intend that the 
"ejusdem generis" rule should apply in the enforcement of this statute and 
emphasized that intent by the words "or any other device." Similar terms 
have received a like construction by other courts. (Grafe v. Delgado, 30 N.M. 
150, 228 P. 601; People v. Carroll, 80 Cal. 153, 22 P. 129; Salt Lake City v. 
Doran, 42 Utah 401, 131 P. 636, 637.) (Emphasis ours). 
Given the above citation from Pepple, supra, our Legislature was well aware of the 
limiting effects of "ejusdem generis" as an interpretative doctrine; as the Supreme Court 
determined it was inapplicable in that case because of the inclusive language used in the statute, 
and concluded that the legislature "evidently did not intend the "ejusdem generis" rule should 
apply in the enforcement of that statute and emphasized that intent by the words "or any other 
device", by stating: "Similar terms have received a like construction by other courts". In 
projecting that same analysis in this appeal, it would be said: The enactment before us contains 
no words of limitation or modification and does not pretend to limit its exclusionary term to only 
such vehicles as previously enumemted, but prefaces the further exclusion with the word "or", 
and then goes on to state "any other such vehicles" that are exempt from the titling or 
registration requirements ..... . 
With Pepple in mind, we look to the two statutory amendments to see what the 
Legislature intended. We begin with LC. § 49-123(V)(2)(h), where the Legislature adopted the 
criteria for "exclusions" of vehicles from the definition of "motor vehicle" (titling or 
registration), wherein the Legislature stated: 
h) Motor vehicle. Every vehicle which is self-propelled, and for the 
purpose of titling and registration meets federal motor vehicle safety 
standards as defined in section 49-107, Idaho Code. Motor vehicle does not 
include vehicles moved solely by human power, electric personal assistive 
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mobility devices and motorized wheelchairs OR other such vehicles that are 
specifically exempt from titling or registration requirements under title 49, 
Idaho Code. (Emphasis ours). 
The emphasis throughout the statute is defining what is a "motor vehicles", being first the 
definition of what constitutes a motor vehicle, and then defining what is not a motor vehicle, 
recognizing some modes of movement are known to be designed to move slowly, and they are 
referenced as being specifically excluded, such as those that are human powered, those that are 
electric mobility devices, those that are motorized wheelchairs, and then those defined, where it 
goes to use the conjunctive word "OR", as among those other such vehicles [even though self-
propelled], specifically exempt from titling or registration requirements under title 49, 
Idaho Code. The statute creates that further and separate category of excluded vehicles 
(with the use of the word "or"), being that category that is exempt from titling or 
registration. 
Through the enactment of LC. §49-114(M)(9)(b), the Legislature specifically exempted 
a class of "vehicles" i.e.: "non-titled" (mopeds), and then "specifically authorized" the operation 
of that "non-titled" mode of movement, ( a "moped) to be operated on Idaho roads without any 
endorsements, and then goes into another statutory provision that excluded mopeds from the 
definition of motorcycle. In this analysis, starting with (M)(9), it states: 
(9) "Moped" means a limited-speed motor-driven cycle having: 
(a) Both motorized and pedal propulsion that is not capable of propelling the 
vehicle at a speed in excess of thirty (30) miles per hour on level ground, 
whether two (2) or three (3) wheels are in contact with the ground during 
operation. If an internal combustion engine is used, the displacement shall not 
exceed fifty (50) cubic centimeters and the moped shall have a power drive 
system that functions directly or automatically without clutching or shifting 
by the operator after the drive system is engaged; or 
(b) Two (2) wheels or three (3) wheels with no pedals, which is powered 
solely by electrical energy, has an automatic transmission, a motor which 
produces less than two (2) gross brake horsepower, is capable of propelling 
the device at a maximum speed of not more than thirty (30) miles per hour on 
level ground and as originally manufactured, meets federal motor vehicle 
safety standards for motor-driven cycles. A moped is not required to be titled 
and no motorcycle endorsement is required/or its operator. 
The law declares a moped excluded from "motor vehicles" because it is a "non-titled" 
mode of movement, and no motorcycle endorsement is required because they are not 
motorcycles, as confirmed by the further amendment to LC. §49-l 14(M)(l 1), which states: 
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(11) "Motorcycle" means every motor vehicle having a seat or saddle for 
the use of the rider, designed to travel on not more than three (3) wheels in 
contact with the ground or designed to travel on two (2) wheels in contact with 
the ground which is modified by the addition of two (2) stabilizing wheels on the 
rear of the motor vehicle, that meets the federal motor vehicle safety standards as 
originally designed, and includes a converted motorbike, but does not include a 
motor-driven cycle, a motorbike, a tractor or a moped. 
Another statutory construction analysis is found in State v. Troughton, 126 Idaho 406, 
884 P .2d 419 (1994 ), the court addressed the rules of construction in the following manner: 
"To answer these questions, we look to the grammatical construction of 
the statute as the legislature intended the statute to be construed according to 
generally accepted principles of English grammar. See State v. Collinsworth, 96 
Idaho 910, 914, 539 P.2d 263, 267 (1975). The Nebraska Supreme Court has 
explained this concept well: "[I]t is the rule of interpretation that relative and 
qualifying words and phrases are to be applied to the words or phrases 
immediately preceding and as not extending to or including other words, phrases, 
or clauses more remote, unless the extension or inclusion is clearly required by 
the intent and meaning of the context, or disclosed by an examination of the 
entire." State v. Jennings, 195 Neb. 434, 238 N.W.2d 477,481 (1976). Under this 
rule, known as the rule of the last antecedent clause, a referential or qualifying 
phrase refers solely to the last antecedent, absent a showing of contrary intent. 
Id. See also Myer v. Ada County, 50 Idaho 39, 41,293 P. 322,323 (1930). 
The question presented for determination is whether the phrase "having a 
stimulant effect on the central nervous system" in LC. § 37-2707 modifies the 
word "substances" or the word "quantity." The trial court ruled that the phrase 
modifies the word "substances," and we agree. It is clear that the words "having a 
stimulant effect on the central nervous system," immediately following the word 
"substances" modifies that noun, and not the word "quantity" used earlier in the 
sentence. Furthermore, had the Idaho Legislature intended that a quantitative 
analysis be required under LC. § 37-2707(d), the legislature would have set forth 
required amounts as it did for certain substances. See, e.g., I.C. §§ 37-2709(e), -
271 l(b), and -2713(c). (Emphasis ours) 
In our case, the focus is upon "slow moving" "motor vehicles", and Legislative intent 
was to specifically exclude non-titled and non-registered slow moving vehicles/modes of 
movement from the definition of "motor vehicle". The language used was a series of categories 
that involved use of the "correlative conjunction" word - "or" - in defining the excluded slow 
moving vehicles, stating those that moved solely by human power, those vehicles that moved 
slowly as electric personal assistive mobility devices, those vehicles that moved slowly as 
motorized wheelchairs OR such other vehicles [slow moving] that are specifically exempt 
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from titling or registration requirements under title 49, Idaho Code. 
Nowhere within any of these statutorily defined categories do we find these 
"vehicles" 1) that "move slowly" (which are defined in LC. § 49-120(S)(15)); 2) vehicles that 
are "electric personal assistive mobility devices" (which are defined in LC. § 49-106(E)(l)), 
and 3) vehicles that are "motorized wheelchairs" (which are defined in LC. § 49-
123(M)(l5)), to be among "vehicles" that are specifically exempted from being "titled" or 
"registered". The "conjunction" word - "or" - is being used to include a separate category of 
vehicles ("other vehicles") that are also exempted from "motor vehicle" because they not only 
move slowly but are non-titled or non-registered, which is categorically defined to include such 
other vehicles, as those that are specifically exempt from titling or registration 
requirements under title 49, Idaho Code. 
The "or" serves to create the final category of these slower moving vehicles (that 
includes mopeds) found in various configurations from other specifically described "slow 
moving vehicles". As part of the amendment to the statute, the Idaho Legislature specifically 
re-defined a "moped" to be among "slow moving vehicles" as mopeds are so defined to mean a 
limited-speed motor-driven cycle. 
Another interpretative case is State v.Yzaguirre, 144 Idaho 471, 163 P.3d 1183 
(2007), involving statutory construction to determine the intended scope of the "litigation 
exception" under the open meeting law established through LC. § 67-2345(1)(£). That court 
stated: 
"The objective of statutory interpretation is to give effect to 
legislative intent. Robison v. Bateman-Hall, 139 Idaho 207, 210, 76 P.3d 
951, 954 (2003). Because "the best guide to legislative intent is the words 
of the statute itself," the interpretation of a statute must begin with the 
literal words of the statute. In re Permit No. 36-7200, 121 Idaho 819, 824, 
828 P.2d 848, 853 (1992); accord McLean v. Maverik Country Stores, Inc., 
142 Idaho 810, 813, 135 P.3d 756, 759 (2006). Where the statutory language 
is unambiguous, the Court does not construe it but simply follows the law as 
written. McLean, 142 Idaho at 813, 135 P.3d at 759. The plain meaning of a 
statute therefore will prevail unless clearly expressed legislative intent is 
contrary or unless plain meaning leads to absurd results. Gillihan v. 
Gump, 140 Idaho 264, 266, 92 P.3d 514, 516 (2004). In determining its 
ordinary meaning "effect must be given to all the words of the statute if 
possible, so that none will be void, superfluous, or redundant." State v. 
Mercer, 143 Idaho 108, 109, 138 P.3d 308, 309 (2006) (quoting In re Winton 
Lumber Company, 57 Idaho 131, 136, 63 P.2d 664, 666 (1936))." (Emphasis 
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ours). 
The court went on to say: 
"If the language of the statute is capable of more than one reasonable 
construction it is ambiguous. Carrier v. Lake Pend Oreille Sch. Dist. No. 84, 142 
Idaho 804, 807, 134 P.3d 655, 658 (2006). An ambiguous statute must be 
construed to mean what the legislature intended it to mean. Id. To ascertain 
legislative intent, the Court examines not only the literal words of the statute, 
but the reasonableness of the proposed interpretations, the policy behind the 
statute, and its legislative history. Id." (Emphasis ours) 
The court then said: 
"Ambiguity is not established merely because the parties present differing 
interpretations to the court. In re Permit No. 36-7200, 121 Idaho at 823-24, 828 
P.2d at 852-53. If the language of the statute is reasonably susceptible of only one 
interpretation, the statute is unambiguous and there is no occasion to look beyond 
the text of the statute. See Id. at 822-24, 828 P.2d at 851-53; Carrier, 142 Idaho at 
807, 134 P.3d at 658. The first step is to examine the literal words of the 
statute to determine whether they support the parties' differing 
interpretations." 
From that analysis, a court will focus upon a "grammatically acceptable interpretation", 
and it appears a "grammatically acceptable interpretation" shows the legislature's intent was to 
exclude mopeds from motor vehicles by excluding them from titling, and in light of the 
declaration of the Senate Transportation Committee, because they are slow moving vehicles-
cycles designed for a limited speed in-town use, the Committee excluded them from registration 
requirements also. 
"Mopeds" were re-defined in LC. § 49-114(M)(9)(a)&(b), described to be "limited-speed 
motor-driven cycles," known to exist in several different forms, described in detail as: 
"Moped" means a limited-speed motor-driven cycle having: 
(a)Botlt motorized and pedal propulsion that is not capable of 
propelling the vehicle at a speed in excess of thirty (30) miles per hour on level 
ground, whether two (2) or three (3) wheels are in contact with the ground during 
operation. If an internal combustion engine is used, the displacement shall not 
exceed fifty (50) cubic centimeters and the moped shall have a power drive 
system that functions directly or automatically without clutching or shifting by the 
operator after the drive system is engaged; or 
(b)Two (2) wheels or three (3) wheels with no pedals, which is powered 
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solely by electrical energy, has an automatic transmission, a motor which 
produces less than two (2) gross brake horsepower, is capable of propelling the 
device at a maximum speed of not more than thirty (30) miles per hour on level 
ground and as originally manufactured, meets federal motor vehicle safety 
standards for motor-driven cycles. A moped is not required to be titled and no 
motorcycle endorsement is required for its operator. (Emphasis ours). 
Mopeds can be two wheel, three wheel, and depending upon their energy source, may be 
petroleum fueled or electrical powered, and depending upon the power source, may or may not 
be pedal activated. 
From the statutory exclusion of "moped," it becomes inconsistent to attempt to call them 
a "motor vehicle," when they are specifically defined to be slow moving "limited speed motor 
driven cycles" specifically exempted from titling, and given the Senate Transportation 
Committee Minutes, not to be registered, because of their limited in-town usage, meeting all 
exclusion/exemption criteria from "motor vehicle" declared as being "slow moving", "no title", 
"no registration", and no "licensing" or "endorsement" requirements under LC. § 49-301. 
It remains logical to conclude our Legislature excluded mopeds from the definition of 
"motor vehicles", intentionally following the footsteps of the California Legislature, as addressed 
in the Armstrong case decided in 2006. 
The stipulated facts confirm this moped was not titled and was not registered, consistent 
with the statutory exclusions that declared mopeds exempt from "titling" and/or "registration" 
requirements, and further realizing the Senate Transportation Committee confirmed in the 
minutes of their March 6, 2008 committee session, stating that mopeds were not intended to be 
registered because they are a slow moving unit used for in-town purposes. 
When an amendatory enactment defines a moped to be exempt from "titling" and then 
"registration" requirements by definition, and upon reading the definition of "motor vehicle", 
LC. § 49-123(M)(2)(h) that specifically states "Motor vehicle does not include vehicles moved 
solely ..... or other such vehicles that are specifically exempt from titling or registration 
requirements under title 49, Idaho Code", the "only grammatically acceptable interpretation" of 
that statutory language, given the intent of the legislature to exclude "slow moving vehicles", 
that includes those exempt from titling or registration", is to embrace the Legislature's intention 
to exclude mopeds from "motor vehicles", and respect the fact the Legislature had to then engage 
in further careful amendatory action to re-define "motorcycles", which, but for the moped 
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exemption they enacted, such re-definition would have been unnecessary. Those provisions, 
along with the Senate stating mopeds are not required to be registered because they are for in-
town use, and defined to be "slow moving motor-driven cycles" provides cumulative reasons to 
recognize the legislative intent was to exclude mopeds from the definition of "motor vehicles". 
A driver's license is not required to operate any of these limited speed-human powered-
fuel-motor driven vehicles-cycles on Idaho streets for in town use, and there can be no criminal 
conduct stemming from their operation under the DWP or DUI statutes, or any citation for 
failing to carry liability insurance or failing to have a current registration. 
(e). WHAT "OTHER SUCH VEHICLES" MEANS 
A reasonable response would be: what is a "grammatically acceptable interpretation"!! 
The Legislature intended to include, with the use of the conjunction word "or" to announce their 
final category of "slow moving vehicles" that are not titled, and now included within their 
reference to "other such vehicles" that are identified to be "exempt from titling or registration 
requirements", and the need for that category becomes relevant when you review the definition 
of the other previously described vehicles, as none of them ( electric personal assistance mobility 
devices and motorized wheelchairs) are anywhere described as being exempt from titling or 
registration. Their definitions were cited above, and no title or registration exemption is stated 
within their definition. Therefore the "category" of other such vehicles, preceded by "or", is an 
additional classification of another form of "slow moving vehicles" that have been specifically 
exempted from titling or registration requirements, and that becomes a separate category of 
another form of slow moving vehicles, identified within the comprehensive statutory definitions 
of other vehicles exempted by the 2008 Legislative amendments. What is not a "motor vehicle," 
is what had become the focus of the 2008 amendments. 
A reasonable grammatical interpretation of the language utilized by the 2008 Legislative 
amendments would support a definition of "motor vehicle" to be: must be selfpropelled, and 
cannot be specifically declared exempt from titling/registration requirements. 
The amendatory enactments "re-defined" what a "motor vehicle" is, and in doing so, 
incorporated certain named "slow moving vehicles", and formulated a specific category for 
"other such [ slow moving] vehicles that are non-titled/non-registered vehicles, all of which are 
excluded from the definition of "motor vehicle". 
In re-defining "motor vehicle," the Legislature was aware that it would necessarily 
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impact what LC. §18-8004 would cover, and what then would be excluded from being a crime, 
as the 2008 Amendatory Legislation changed the LC. § 49-123(V) definitions, with full 
knowledge of the existence of all criminal statutes, and when they included part (2)(h), adding 
specific "definitions" and specific "exclusionary" aspects to their "re-definition" of what is not a 
motor vehicle, and that new definition undertakes to specifically define their exemptions in LC. § 
49-123(V)(2)(h), that now specifically states: 
"Motor vehicle" does not include vehicles that moved solely by human 
power, electric personal assistive mobility devices, and motorized wheelchairs, QJ:. 
other such vehicles that are specifically exempt from titling "or" registration 
requirements under Title 49, Idaho Code. 
It is to be noted that a "motorized wheelchair", by definition, is a "motor vehicle". It's 
definition is contained in I.C. § 49-123(M)(15), which states: "Motorized wheelchair" means a 
motor vehicle with a speed not in excess of eight (8) miles per hour, designed for and used by a 
person with a disability. Because it is defined to be a motor vehicle, and is not within the 
category of what is non-titled or non-registered, it had to have its own categorical exclusion. It 
had to be excluded separately from "motor vehicle" because it~ a motor vehicle, and was not 
otherwise "exempted" within the category of "other such vehicles" from a titling/registration 
requirements. The statutory language is clear that no such exemption is anywhere stated in the 
definition for "electric personal assistive mobility devices as no such exemption is stated within 
their definitions. 
The placement of the word "such", is not an "antecedent reference" to the earlier 
mentioned vehicles (electric personal assistive mobility devices and motorized wheelchairs), as 
the use of the word "or" has broken up the categories, and requires the focus to be upon "slow 
moving" in the context of the phrase "motor vehicle does not include", since the correlative 
conjunctive word "or" creates another category of what are also slow moving vehicles, and they 
are excluded, as it relates to "other such [ slow moving] vehicles", which are exempted from 
titling or registration requirements. 
Would it make a difference in the grammatical analysis if "or" was followed with the 
phrase "such other vehicles" rather than "other such vehicles"? It would appear to render the 
same message, saying "such other [slow moving] vehicles" or "other such [slow moving] 
vehicles". Because the category is separated with the word "or", which then addresses a specific 
and different "exempt status", it then presents a different category of "slow moving vehicles" 
41 
and their focus is then on their "exempt status", is based upon their non-titled and/or non-
registered status. The legislature had to specifically name certain slow moving modes of 
movement because they were defined to be "motor vehicles" by their definition, and not within 
their "exempt status", and that was the very situation with what they defined a "motorized 
wheelchair" to be. 
It is essential to remember that there was a "definition" of a "moped" that existed before 
2008, but its exempt status from titling requirements did not exist until after the 2008 
amendatory enactments. Amendatory enactments means a change was intended. The "general 
rule" with respect to "amendatory" enactments of the legislature is that the amendments of 
existing statutes are presumed to change the law. IA Sutherland Statutory Construction § 
22:30 Construction of amendatory acts - Presumption of Change. See e.g., St. Alphonsus 
Regional Medical Center v. Gooding County, 159 Idaho 84, 89, 356 P.3d 377, 382 (2015) 
("When a statute is amended, it is presumed that the legislature intended it to have a meaning 
different from that accorded to it before the amendment." (Citations omitted)). 
It was before addressed in LC. § 49-l 14(M), through the inclusion of what was then 
subsection (9), but now provides that mopeds are expressly exempted from titling requirements, 
intending to exclude mopeds from the definition of "motor vehicle" as that phrase is used in LC. 
§ 49-123(V)(2)(h) as cited above. 
These "exclusions" were adopted, firstly, within LC. §49-123(V)(2)(h), where they 
addressed titling or registration requirements, then the "exempting" provision from titling in the 
definition of "moped" in LC. §49-114(M)(9)(a)&(b); then the definition of "motorbike", LC. 
§49-114(M)(10), where they made reference to J.C. §67-7101(9), declaring them to be a 
. "motorcycle or motor-driven cycle", with a definition of "motorcycle" and "motor driven cycle", 
wherein mopeds are specifically excluded, as "motorcycle" is defined in LC. §49-114(M)(l l), 
wherein it expressly excludes a moped; then the definition of "motor-driven cycle", LC. §49-
114(M)(13), which specifically excludes mopeds from what they call "motor-driven cycles", and 
then the definition of "Motorized wheelchair" in J.C. §49-114(M)(15), where it's defined to be a 
motor vehicle. These definitions, when considered together, confirm the legislative intent in their 
re-defining certain vehicles-cycles, focused also upon what are not "motor vehicles", and they 
became an exclusion by specific reference, or a specific categorical exception. These specific 
definitions are set forth below, wherein they state: 
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I. C. §49-114. Definitions -- M .... 
(9) "Moped" means a limited-speed MOTOR-DRIVEN CYCLE having: 
( a) Both motorized and pedal propulsion that is not capable of propelling the 
vehicle at a speed in excess of thirty (30) miles per hour on level ground, whether 
two (2) or three (3) wheels are in contact with the ground during operation. If an 
internal combustion engine is used, the displacement shall not exceed fifty (50) 
cubic centimeters and the moped shall have a power drive system that functions 
directly or automatically without clutching or shifting by the operator after the 
drive system is engaged; or 
(b) Two (2) wheels or three (3) wheels with no pedals, which is powered solely 
by electrical energy, has an automatic transmission, a motor which produces less 
than two (2) gross brake horsepower, is capable of propelling the device at a 
maximum speed of not more than thirty (30) miles per hour on level ground and 
as originally manufactured, meets federal motor vehicle safety standards for 
motor-driven cycles. A MOPED IS NOT REQUIRED TO BE TITLED AND 
NO MOTORCYCLE ENDORSEMENT IS REQUIRED FOR ITS 
OPERATOR. 
(10) "Motorbike" means a vehicle as defined in section 67-7101, Idaho 
Code. Such vehicle SHALL BE TITLED and .MAY BE APPROVED FOR 
MOTORCYCLE REGISTRATION pursuant to section 49-402, Idaho Code, upon 
certification by the owner OF THE INSTALLATION AND USE OF 
CONVERSION COMPONENTS THAT .MAKE THE MOTORBIKE 
COMPLIANT WITH FEDERAL MOTOR VEHICLE SAFETY STANDARDS. 
{I. C. §67-7101(9) "Motorbike" means any self-propelled two (2) wheeled 
motorcycle or motor-driven cycle, excluding tractor, designed for or capable of 
traveling off developed roadways and highways and also referred to as trailbikes, 
enduro bikes, trials bikes, motocross bikes or dual purpose motorcycles.} 
(11) "Motorcycle" means every MOTOR VEHICLE having a seat or 
saddle for the use of the rider, designed to travel on not more than three (3) 
wheels in contact with the ground or designed to travel on two (2) wheels in 
contact with the ground which is modified by the addition of two (2) stabilizing 
wheels on the rear of the motor vehicle, that meets the federal motor vehicle 
safety standards as originally designed, and includes a converted motorbike, BUT 
DOES NOT INCLUDE a motor-driven cycle, a motorbike, a tractor OR A 
MOPED. 
(13) "MOTOR-DRIVEN CYCLE" means a CYCLE with a motor that 
produces five (5) brake horsepower or less as originally manufactured that meets 
federal motor vehicle safety standards as originally designed, AND DOES NOT 
INCLUDE MOPEDS. such vehicle shall be titled and a motorcycle endorsement 
is required for its operation. . .. 
(15) "Motorized wheelchair" means a MOTOR VEHICLE with a speed 
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not in excess of eight (8) miles per hour, designed for and used by a person with a 
disability. 
Whatever a "motor vehicle" is defined to be, it remains axiomatic the Legislative 
intention was to adopt exclusions from what is a "motor vehicle" through specific references and 
a specific classification of exemptions resulting from non-titling and non-registration status. 
It is this appellate court's opportunity to confirm what the legislature clearly intended 
would not be a motor vehicle, and that is to be accomplished by embracing what the Legislature 
specifically excluded from the definition of "motor vehicle" by virtue of the exemption of the 
titling/registration requirement. 
The definition of"motor vehicle", prior to 2008, was set forth in LC. 49-123(V)(2)(h): 
(g) Motor vehicle. Every vehicle which is self-propelled and every vehicle 
which is propelled by electric power obtained from overhead trolley wires but not 
operated upon rails, except vehicles moved solely by human power, electric 
. personal assistive mobility devices and motorized wheelchairs. 
The Legislature made changes to adopt the new definition, and expanded the exclusions 
with a special class of exemption, to wit: non-titled/non-registered. The Legislature intended to 
expand upon the exclusions, based upon the adoption of their exemptions that would be 
addressed and identified elsewhere within the motor vehicle code. 
As before stated above, what likely influenced these 2008 motor vehicle code 
modifications by our Legislature is the analysis the Idaho Supreme Court undertook in their 
discussion regarding mopeds in 2006, when addressing the concept of a mopeds in contrast to 
motorcycles, and specifically recognized mopeds had "exempt" status from "Motor vehicle" in 
California, when discussing what is and what is not a "motor vehicle". In that case, Armstrong v. 
Farmers Ins. Co. of Idaho, 143 Idaho 135, 139 P.3d 737 (2006), our Supreme Court specifically 
took the occasion to state: 
"At issue in Galvin was a prov1s10n excluding coverage for injuries 
sustained by a person occupying a motor vehicle owned by the insured but not 
covered in the policy. A father had obtained coverage for his 1979 Dodge, but 
not his moped, and his son was iniured while riding the moped. The father 
contended that the exclusion for other owned motor vehicles did not apply to the 
moped because it was not a motor vehicle. The Galvin court agreed, relying 
upon the facts that mopeds were designed to be propelled by pedaling in 
addition to their motors; that they were exempt from registration under the 
Vehicle Code; and that while motorcycles were defined as being motor vehicles 
under the Vehicle Code, mopeds were not. It stated that while a motorcycle had 
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been held to be motor vehicle under a similar exclusionary clause, "the implied 
analogy between mopeds and motorcycles is tenuous and cannot be relied upon 
as the basis for finding that a moped is a motor vehicle." 170 Cal.App.3d at 
1022, 216 Cal.Rptr. at 846. The instant case involves a motorcycle, not a moped. 
A motorcycle is defined as a motor vehicle under the Idaho motor vehicle code. 
LC. § 49-114(10). [Now LC. § 49-114(11)] 143 Idaho at 138, 139 P.3d at 740 
(bracketed reference added)" (Emphasis ours). 
Now we have not only the California analysis, but also the 2008 Legislative enactments 
that defines mopeds to be excluded from "motor vehicle" by their specific exemption. The 
Armstrong case drew the attention of the Idaho Legislature to consider the exclusionary aspects 
of mopeds when addressing the comprehensive re-defining process of "motor vehicle" that took 
effect in 2008, just as in California. Idaho elected to specifically exempt mopeds with the titling 
exclusion, but given the determination by the Senate Transportation Committee on March 6, 
2008, the Senate did not intend for mopeds to be registered either, so they are exempted from 
motor vehicle through both non-titling and non-registration exceptions. 
The discussion within Armstrong, supra, in 2006 focused upon definitions of 
"motorcycle", of "motor vehicle," and of California's exclusion of a "moped" from "motor 
vehicle", as a moped was defined (even back in 2006) under California law, to be excluded from 
a "motor vehicle." What Idaho's definition of a motorcycle in 2006 was then identified in LC. § 
49-114(10), and is now contained in LC. § 49-l 14(M)(l l). When the Idaho Legislature took the 
initiative in 2008 to amend its definitions of various vehicles and modes of movement, it does 
appear Idaho embraced aspects of California's laws, and benefitted with the analysis set forth in 
Armstrong, supra. Idaho's Legislature essentially adopted these California definition(s), and as a 
consequence, Idaho expressly excluded mopeds from its definition of a "motor vehicle" as well 
as from "motorcycle," and from "motorbike", clearly a moped can no longer be regarded a 
"motor vehicle" under Idaho law. These new definitions of motor vehicle, motorcycle, 
motorbike, and moped deliberately adopted and repeatedly emphasized the intended exclusion of 
mopeds from motor vehicles, motorcycles, and motorbikes, and specifically addressed "moped" 
separately in LC. § 49-114(M)(9), as a "limited speed, motor driven cycle," that is not titled, 
having no motorcycle endorsement requirements, and painfully defined separately from what 
constitutes "motor vehicles," "motorcycles" and "motorbikes." 
Given the combined definitions, exemptions, and exclusions now found in the law, there 
is no basis to require a moped operator to have a policy of "motor vehicle" liability insurance 
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under Idaho's "Motor Vehicle" Financial Responsibility Act, Title 49, Chapter 12, enacted under 
LC. § 49-1229, as the Statute provides: 
Required motor vehicle insurance. (1) Every owner of a motor vehicle 
which is registered and operated in Idaho by the owner or with his permission 
shall continuously, except as provided in section 41-2516, Idaho Code, provide 
insurance against loss resulting from liability imposed by law for bodily injury or 
death or damage to property suffered by any person caused by maintenance or use 
of motor vehicles described therein in an amount not less than that required by 
section 49-117, Idaho Code, and shall demonstrate the existence of any other 
coverage required by this title or a certificate of self-insurance issued by the 
department pursuant to section 49-1224, Idaho Code, for each motor vehicle to be 
registered. (Emphasis ours). 
The mode of movement requiring insurance is a "registered motor vehicle". Neither the 
"motor vehicle" definition, nor the "registration" requirement exists with respect to various slow 
moving vehicles that now include a moped since 2008. When a moped is "excluded" from the 
definition of a "motor vehicle" (no titling), and when not required to be registered (Senate 
Transportation Committee), it cannot be subject to "insurance" requirements, as only 
"registered" "motor vehicles" are required to be insured under Idaho's Motor Vehicle Financial 
Responsibility Act. 
(f). MOPEDS ARE UNIQUE UNDER IDAHO LAW 
A "moped", as defined above in LC. §49-114(M) (9)( a )&(b ), can be in several forms, two 
wheel, three wheel, and depending on its energy source, may be a small fuel powered engine, or 
an electrical powered motor. 
Because mopeds are not a "motor vehicle" under the law, the operator is not subject to the 
"licensing" requirements under LC. §49-301 or liability insurance requirements. 
VIII. 
CONCLUSION 
This Appellant did not operate a "motor vehicle" while under the influence of alcohol, 
but rather, as the facts and law has established, was operating a "slow moving" "limited speed" 
"motor driven cycle" that is non-titled, declared by the Idaho Legislature to be a "moped", within 
the 2008 Legislative amendatory enactments, specifically excluded from the definition of "motor 
vehicle", under Idaho law. The decision of the district court, affirming the conviction of Appellant, 
upon his conditional plea of guilty, must be set aside, vacated and reversed, as Appellant did not 
violate the provisions of L C. § 18-8004 when he was operating his "moped" as his mode of 
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movement was not a "motor vehicle" as declared by the Idaho egisl ure, and the ma r m st be 
remanded with instructions to enter an order vacating the c 
complaint filed in the case. 
Respectfully submitted this 1 ih day of Novemb 
' Vernon K. Smit , 
Attorney for Appellant 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY That on the 1 ih day of November, 2017, I caused a true and corre 
copy of the above and foregoing Appellant's Opening Brief to be filed/delivered/serve 
required by the Idaho Appellate Rules to the following, at the following addresses: 
STATE OF IDAHO 
ATTORNEY GENERAL 
Criminal Law Division 
700 W. Jefferson Street 
P.O. Box 83720 
Boise, Idaho 83720-0010 




200 West Front Street 
Boise, Idaho 83720 
. Honorable Kevin Swain 
Magistrate Judge 
Ada County 
200 West Front Street 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
Boise City Attorney's Office 
Robert B. Luce/Jack W. Relf 
Boise City Attorney's Office 
150 N. Capitol Blvd 
P.O. Box 500 
Boise, Idaho 83701-0500 










( X ) 
( ) 
( X ) 
( ) 
( ) 
( ) 
47 
U.S. Mail 
Fax 
Hand Delivered 
!Court E-filed 
U.S. Mail 
Fax 
Hand Delivered 
!Court E-filed 
U.S. Mail 
Fax 
Hand Delivered 
!Court E-filed 
U.S. Mail 
